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Abstract:	  In	  this	  essay,	  I	  address	  one	  methodological	  aspect	  of	  Victor	  Tadros's	  The	  Ends	  of	  
Harm-­‐-­‐namely,	  the	  moral	  character	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  criminal	  punishment	  it	  defends.	  First,	  I	  offer	   a	   brief	   reconstruction	   of	   this	   dimension	   of	   the	   argument,	   highlighting	   some	   of	   its	  distinctive	   strengths	   while	   drawing	   attention	   to	   particular	   inconsistencies.	   I	   then	   argue	  that	  Tadros	  ought	  to	  refrain	   from	  developing	  this	  approach	   in	  terms	  of	  an	  overly	  narrow	  understanding	   of	   the	  morality	   of	   harming	   as	   fully	   unified	   and	   reconciled	   under	   the	   lone	  heading	   of	   justice.	   In	   a	   final	   and	   most	   critical	   section,	   I	   offer	   arguments	   for	   why	   this	  reconciliatory	   commitment,	   further	   constrained	   by	   a	   misplaced	   emphasis	   on	   corrective	  justice,	   generates	   major	   problems	   for	   his	   general	   deterrence	   account	   of	   the	   core	  justification	  of	  criminal	  punishment.	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  JUSTICE:	  THE	  NEXT	  BEST	  MORAL	  THEORY
OF	  CRIMINAL	  PUNISHMENT?	  
François	  Tanguay-­‐Renaud*	  
Forthcoming:	  Law	  and	  Philosophy	  (2012)	  Victor	  Tadros’s	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm	  (TEH)1	  is	  exceptionally	  rich	  in	  provocative	  novel	  insights.	  In	  this	  essay,	  I	  primarily	  focus	  on	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  book’s	  overall	  methodology,	  namely,	  the	  resolutely	  moral	  character	  of	   the	   theory	  of	  criminal	  punishment	   it	  defends.	   In	  section	   I,	   I	  offer	   a	   brief	   reconstruction	   of	   this	   dimension	   of	   the	   argument,	   emphasising	   some	   of	   its	  distinctive	  strengths	  while	  drawing	  attention	   to	  particular	   inconsistencies.	   In	   section	   II,	   I	  contend,	   more	   critically,	   that	   Tadros	   ought	   to	   refrain	   from	   developing	   this	   approach	   in	  terms	  of	  an	  overly	  narrow	  understanding	  of	   the	  morality	  of	  harming	  as	   fully	  unified	  and	  reconciled	   under	   the	   lone	   heading	   of	   justice.	   As	   I	   argue	   in	   section	   III,	   this	   theoretical	  commitment,	   constrained	   by	   a	   surprising	   emphasis	   on	   corrective	   justice,	   generates	  significant	  problems	  for	  his	  account	  of	  the	  core	  justification	  of	  punishment.	  
I.	  A	  MORAL	  THEORY	  OF	  CRIMINAL	  JUSTICE	  Tadros	  spends	  most	  of	  TEH	  developing	  an	  argument	  for	  what	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  a	  moral,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  political,	  theory	  of	  criminal	  punishment.	  Thus,	  he	  implicitly	  rejects	  the	  oft-­‐encountered	  claim	  that	  sound	  argument	  about	  criminal	  law	  and	  punishment	  must	  remain	  confined	   to	   the	   realm	   of	   state	   and	   law—or,	   more	   broadly,	   to	   distinctively	   political	  theorizing.2	  	  His	  argument	  builds	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	  paradigmatic	   crimes	   involve	  culpable	  wrongdoing	  that	  causes	  harm	  to	  one	  or	  more	  individual	  victims.	  If	  murders,	  rapes,	  assaults,	  burglaries,	   frauds,	   and	   torture	   are	   punishable	   crimes,	   it	   is	   primarily	   because	   they	   harm	  
* Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, and Member of the Graduate Faculty of the Department of
Philosophy, York University, Toronto. Thanks are owed to Mohamad Al-Hakim, Vincent Chiao, and Hamish 
Stewart for discussing and challenging many ideas contained in this essay in the context of a reading group focusing 
on The Ends of Harm. I would also like to thank Vincent Chiao, Kimberly Ferzan and Victor Tadros for their written 
comments on an earlier version. 
1	  Victor	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm:	  The	  Moral	  Foundations	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  
2	  Cf.	  Arthur	  Ripstein,	  Force	  and	  Freedom:	  Kant’s	  Legal	  and	  Political	  Philosophy	  (Cambridge,	  Massachussetts:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  ch.10;	  Malcolm	  Thorburn,	  “Constitutionalism	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Law”,	  in	  R.A.	  Duff,	  Lindsay	  Farmer,	  S.E.	  Marshall,	  Massimo	  Renzo,	  and	  Victor	  Tadros	  (eds.),	  The	  Structures	  of	  
the	   Criminal	   Law	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	   2012),	   pp.	   85-­‐105,	   at	   pp.	   87-­‐88,	   97-­‐101;	   George	   P.	  Fletcher,	  The	  Grammar	  of	  Criminal	  Law:	  American,	  Comparative,	  and	  International:	  Volume	  One:	  Foundations	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  154.	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   in	  violation	  of	  our	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  others.	  And	  like	  other	  duties	  that	  ground	  his	  overall	  theory—such	  as	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  use	  people	  as	  means,	  and	  to	  rescue	  them	  from	  harm—the	   duty	   not	   to	   harm	   others	   is	   fundamentally	   moral,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   pre-­‐political.	  The	  criminal	  law	  merely	  builds	  on	  it,	  specifies	  it,	  and	  coordinates	  its	  enforcement.	  Thus,	  what	  TEH	   seeks	   to	  offer	   is	  a	   justificatory	  story	  about	  criminal	   law	  and	  punishment	  that	  starts	  from	  first	  principles,	  and	  resists	  any	  temptation	  to	  run	  ahead	  hurriedly	  to	  a	  later	  ‘political’	   point,	   artificially	   segregated	   from	   the	   deep	   and	   complex	   reality	   of	   morality,	  broadly	  understood.	  And	   deep	   and	   complex	   morality	   is,	   with	   the	   morality	   of	   harming	   forming	   no	  exception.	  So	  complex,	  in	  fact,	  that	  Tadros	  concedes	  that	  even	  able	  philosophers	  will	  often	  have	  a	  hard	  time	  getting	  it	  right	  in	  the	  details.	  For	  example,	  if,	  as	  he	  assumes,	  it	  is	  generally	  wrong	   to	   intentionally	   harm	   someone	   in	   a	   way	   that	   disrespects	   her	   status	   as	   an	  autonomous	  agent,	   one	  may	  wonder	  whether	   some	  motivations	   for	  harming	  people	  may	  mark	   sufficient	   respect	   for	   this	   status	   to	  make	  harming	  permissible.	   Tadros	   thinks	   there	  are	  such	  motivations.	  Thus,	  he	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  for	  the	  driver	  of	  an	  unstoppable	  trolley	  to	  divert	   it	   in	  a	  way	  that	  kills	  one	  person	  instead	  of	  the	  five	  towards	  which	  it	  was	  originally	  heading—insofar,	  he	  insists,	  as	  the	  driver	  diverts	  the	  trolley	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  appropriate	   status-­‐conferring	   features	   of	   the	   five	   people	   saved.	   Yet,	   he	   is	   unsure	   what	  specific	  status-­‐conferring	  features	  the	  driver	  must	  have	  in	  mind	  when	  diverting	  the	  trolley,	  as	   well	   as	   how	   exactly	   these	   features	   must	   figure	   in	   her	   motivational	   make-­‐up.	   The	  guidance	  he	  provides	  is	  minimal,	  and	  mostly	  illustrative.	  So,	  he	  tells	  us,	  diverting	  the	  trolley	  in	  order	   to	  kill	   the	  one,	   for	  personal	  glory,	  or	   to	  preserve	   those	  whom	  the	  driver	  merely	  understands	   as	   rare	   flowers	   or	   God’s	   artworks	   would	   not	   pass	   muster.	   Remarkably,	  though,	  instead	  of	  seeking	  to	  provide	  a	  deeper	  explanation,	  he	  then	  quickly	  concedes	  that	  questions	   about	   permissible	  motivations	   and	   value-­‐conferring	   features	   of	   human	   beings	  are	  notoriously	  difficult	  and	  subject	  to	  profound	  disagreements.	  He	  even	  asserts	  that	  these	  disagreements	  may	   be	   such	   as	   to	   require	   “criminal	   law	   and	  moral	   judgement”	   to	   “come	  apart	  sharply.”	   	  Unlike	  morality,	  he	  continues,	   “The	  criminal	   law	   is	  not	   in	   the	  business	  of	  investigating	   the	   full	   motivational	   structure	   that	   guided	   the	   defendant’s	   decision	   in	  deciding	  to	  do	  what	  he	  did.”3	  	  Coming	   from	   someone	   who	   promises	   a	   rather	   continuous	   story	   between	   the	  ordinary	   morality	   of	   harming	   and	   its	   instantiation	   in	   the	   institutional	   context	   of	   the	  criminal	  law,	  this	  suggestion	  comes	  as	  somewhat	  of	  a	  surprise.	  If	  deep	  motivational	  make-­‐ups	  are	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  moral	  wrongs	  like	  murder	  and	  assault,	  and	  criminal	  law	  is	  concerned	  with	   the	   condemnation	   and	  punishment	   of	   some	   such	  wrongs,	   should	  Tadros	  not	  strive	  to	  provide	  a	  clearer	  moral	  picture?	  Indeed,	  isn’t	  such	  a	  picture	  necessary	  if	  grave	  moral	  errors	  of	  judgment,	  condemnation,	  and	  punishment	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  are	   to	   be	   avoided?	   In	   TEH,	   Tadros	   sidesteps	   the	   challenge	   by	   taking	   hasty	   refuge	   in	  
3	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  p.	  166.	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 institutional	  considerations:	  of	  neutrality	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  face	  of	  deep	  disagreements,	  of	  individual	  privacy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  might	  of	  the	  law,	  and	  of	  conflicting	  functions	  of	  criminal	  justice	   including	   not	   only	   condemnation	   of	  wrongdoing,	   but	   optimal	   deterrence.	   Yet,	   the	  nature	  of	  his	  project	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  more	  basic,	  pre-­‐institutional	  moral	   story	   about	   the	   proper	   limits	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   a	   person’s	   deep	  motivations	   and	   wrongdoing.	   Unfortunately	   for	   Tadros,	   his	   failure	   to	   investigate	   this	  possibility,	   and	   his	   readiness	   to	   justify	   criminal	   law	   in	   terms	   of	   separate	   institutional	  considerations,	   expose	   him	   to	   attacks	   from	   theorists	   who	   are	   determined	   to	   affirm	   that	  criminal	   law	   theory	  must	   have	   a	   political,	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	  more	   general	  moral,	   starting	  point.	   	  	  	   I	  say	  “unfortunately”	  because,	  in	  spite	  of	  sporadic	  inconsistencies	  such	  as	  this	  one,4	  
TEH	   evidences	   an	   outstanding	   effort	   to	   uncover	   the	   deep	   objective	   morality	   in	   which	  criminal	  law	  and	  punishment	  may	  find	  their	  basic	  justification.	  Of	  course,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  harm,	   so-­‐called	   political	   considerations	   may	   never	   loom	   far	   behind.	   After	   all,	   the	  justification	  for	  the	  modern	  state	  is	  commonly	  thought	  to	  rest,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  shield	  its	  citizens	  from	  harm.	  At	  one	  point,	  Tadros	  even	  provocatively	  muses	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  special,	  state-­‐based	  “duty	  of	  equality	  that	  we	  owe	  our	  fellow	  citizens	  [and	  which]	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  stronger	  duty	  to	  punish	  than	  the	  duty	  that	  is	  based	  simply	  on	  the	  universal	  duty	  to	  rescue,”	   in	  which	  he	  otherwise	  grounds	  his	  argument	  in	  TEH.5	  Still,	   it	   is	  universal	  moral	  duties	  that	  take	  the	  center	  stage	  in	  the	  book.	  	  As	   Tadros	   understands	   them,	   universal	   duties	   apply	   both	   outside	   and	   inside	   the	  context	  of	  the	  state.	  They	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  state	  just	  as	  they	  apply	  to	  ordinary	  individuals—a	   contention	   that,	   despite	   what	   some	   politically-­‐leaning	   theorists	   may	   claim,	   is	   all	   but	  mysterious.	   If,	  as	  Tadros	  suggests,	  modern	  states	  essentially	  boil	  down	  to	   large	  groups	  of	  individuals	   acting	   in	   concert	   to	   fulfill	   certain	   tasks,	   duties	   on	   the	   state	   can	   simply	   be	  understood	   as	   duties	   that	   these	   individuals	   share	   amongst	   themselves.6	   One	   might	  legitimately	   question	  whether	   such	   radical	  methodological	   individualism	   about	   the	   state	  does	  not	   leave	  out	  an	   important	  part	  of	   the	  moral	  picture.	   I	  am	  alluding	  here	   to	   the	  part	  according	  to	  which	  the	  modern	  state	  may	  also	  be	  a	  corporate	  moral	  agent	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  with	   moral	   duties	   that	   it	   may	   violate	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   irreducible	   to	   violations	   by	   its	  individual	   members.7	   Still,	   according	   to	   both	   of	   these	   accounts,	   Tadros’s	   claim	   that	  applications	  of	  universal	  moral	  duties	   to	   the	  state	  are	  merely	  particular	  applications—no	  different	  in	  kind	  from	  applications	  to	  ordinary	  individuals—remains	  highly	  plausible.	  	  
                                                4	  Tadros	  is	  also	  quick	  to	  help	  himself	  to	  institutional	  considerations	  when	  arguing	  against	  the	  permissibility	  of	  manipulatively	  killing	  wrongdoers	  to	  use	  their	  organs	  to	  cure	  the	  sick.	  Ibid.,	  at	  pp.	  307-­‐311.	  	  5	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  311.	  	  6	  See	  ibid.,	  at	  p.	  299.	  	  7	  	  See	  especially	  Christian	  List	  and	  Philip	  Pettit,	  Group	  Agency:	  The	  Possibility,	  Design,	  and	  Status	  of	  Corporate	  
Agents	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  chs	  1,	  7,	  8.	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   Of	   course,	   given	   their	   typically	   greater	   resources	   and	   claims,	   states	   and	   their	  institutions	  may	  have	  more	  extensive	  or	  stringent	  moral	  duties	  than	  ordinary	  individuals.	  The	  rule	  of	  law,	  with	  its	  associated	  requirement	  that	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  a	  person	  may	  be	  punished	  be	  publicized	  ex	  ante,	   is	  a	  good	  example.	  On	  a	  desert	   island	  where	  you	  would	  assault	  me	  repetitively	  until	  I	  die,	  unless	  I	  deter	  you	  through	  punishment,	  it	  would	  no	  doubt	  be	  permissible	  for	  me—or	  a	  third	  party	  who	  arrives	  on	  the	  island—to	  punish	  you,	  even	  though	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  has	  not	  been	  established.	  Yet,	  “[i]n	  modern	  states,	  […]	  where	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  establish	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  it	  is	  typically	  wrong	  to	  punish	  a	  person	  who	  has	   not	   violated	   the	   criminal	   law.”8	   The	   moral	   importance	   of	   choice	   in	   culpable	  wrongdoing,	  and	  the	  modest	  costs	  that	  states	  must	  typically	  incur	  to	  ensure	  that	  people	  are	  provided,	  through	  prior	  notice,	  with	  a	  proper	  opportunity	  to	  choose	  to	  avoid	  punishment,	  militate	  strongly	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  requirement.	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  rule-­‐of-­‐law	  duties	  only	  apply	   to	   the	   state	   and	   not	   to	   ordinary	   individuals,	   such	   that	   we	   ought	   to	   speak	   of	  qualitatively	   distinct	   duties—perhaps	   even	   of	   a	   purely	   ‘political	  morality’—applicable	   to	  the	  state.	  As	  Tadros	  recognizes,	  “there	  may	  be	  strong	  reasons	  on	  the	  desert	  island	  to	  begin	  to	  develop	   the	   rule	  of	   law”—such	  as	   to	  ensure,	  when	   the	   costs	  are	   reasonable,	   that	  non-­‐serial	   would-­‐be	   wrongdoers	   are	   given	   a	   proper	   opportunity	   to	   avoid	   punishment.9	   The	  point	  is,	  rather,	  that	  while	  universal	  moral	  duties	  may	  differ	  in	  scope	  and	  intensity	  in	  their	  various	  applications	  to	  ordinary	  individuals	  and	  states,	  they	  do	  not	  differ	  in	  kind.	  And	  here,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  constitutes	  merely	  one	  illustrative	  example,	  alongside	  other	  universal	  duties	  such	  as	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  others,	  the	  duty	  to	  rescue	  them	  from	  harm,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	   There	  should	  be	  no	  surprise	  here,	  since	  states,	  qua	  organized	  groups	  of	  individuals,	  are	   not	   all	   or	   nothing	   affairs,	  which,	   at	   a	   given	   stage	   of	   their	   development,	  mysteriously	  leave	  ordinary	  morality	  behind	  to	  enter	  a	  different	  normative	  realm.	  Instead,	  states	  tend	  to	  come	  together	  and	  evolve	  gradually,	  often	  with	  setbacks	  along	  the	  way—be	  it	  in	  respect	  of	  their	   de	   facto	   authority,	   their	   resources,	   the	   level	   of	   commitment	   of	   their	   individual	  members,	  or	  the	  complexity	  and	  efficacy	  of	  their	   institutional	  structures.	  One	  of	  the	  great	  strengths	  of	  Tadros’s	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  casts	  into	  sharp	  relief	  how	  morality	  can	  adapt	  itself	  to	  the	  circumstances	  and	  stages	  of	  development	  of	  any	  given	  state,	  just	  as	  it	  adapts	  itself	  to	  the	  circumstances	  and	  stages	  of	  development	  of	  ordinary	  individuals.	  	  	  No	  doubt,	  political	  theory,	  understood	  as	  that	  particular	  branch	  of	  moral	  theory	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  normative	  position	  of	  the	  state,	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  To	  make	  complete	  sense	  of,	   and	   assess,	   criminal	   law	   and	   criminal	   punishment	   as	   we	   know	   them—namely,	   as	  exclusive	  instruments	  of	  the	  state—we	  also	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  reasons,	  including	  the	  duties,	  that	  we	  may	  have	  to	  defer	  and	  contribute	  specifically	  to	  state	  action	  in	  this	  sphere.	  Yet,	   one	   must	   strive	   to	   avoid	   mistaken	   political	   theoretical	   currents.	   For	   example,	   one	  should	  not	  assume	  that,	  because	  morality	  is	  sometimes	  the	  object	  of	  deep	  disagreements,	  
                                                8	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  p.	  317.	  	  	  9	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  316.	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 what	  the	  state	  decides	  must	  ultimately	  carry	  the	  day.10	  As	  Tadros	  suggests,	  a	  helpful	  way	  of	  averting	   this	  kind	  of	  mistake	   is	   to	   conceive	  of	   the	   state	  as	  an	   instrument	  whose	  primary	  purpose	   is	   to	   assist	   individuals	   in	   realizing	  moral	   duties	   that	   they	  would	   not	   be	   able	   to	  fulfill,	   or	   fulfill	   as	   well,	   without	   it.	   When	   the	   nature	   or	   contours	   of	   such	   duties	   are	  controversial,	  the	  state	  may	  assist	  us	  by	  specifying	  them	  and	  their	  ramifications,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  coordinating	   their	  application,	   through	   its	   law.	   In	   fact,	   the	  state	  may	  often	  be	  under	  a	  rule-­‐of-­‐law	  duty	  to	  do	  so.	  At	  times,	  the	  state	  may	  also	  facilitate	  our	  conformity	  with	  duties	  by	   undertaking	   to	   fulfill	   them	   on	   our	   behalf.	   Still,	   state	   action	   is	   always	   open	   to	   moral	  scrutiny.	  The	   state	  may	  get	   things	  wrong,	   and	  may	   sometimes	  get	   them	  so	  wrong	   that	   it	  would	  be	  better	  for	  us	  to	  disregard	  completely	  its	  claimed	  attempts	  at	  assistance.	  	  	  So,	   Tadros	   argues,	   insofar	   as	   culpable	   wrongdoers	   have	   an	   enforceable	   duty	   to	  submit	   themselves	   to	  punishment,	   insofar	  as	  we	  all	  have	  a	  duty	   to	  see	   to	   it	   that	   they	  are	  punished	  as	  a	  means	  of	  deterring	  further	  wrongdoing,	  and	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  state	  can	  perform	  such	  actions	  more	   justly	  and	  effectively	   than	   individuals,	   it	  may	  well	  be	   that	  we	  should	   defer	   (and,	   in	   many	   cases,	   contribute)	   to	   it	   doing	   so.	   Yet,	   the	   possibility	   always	  remains	  that	  a	  state’s	  punishment	  practices	  are	  so	  unjust	  or	  so	  ineffective	  that	  “individual	  punishment	  will	   be	   […]	  preferable	   to	   state	  punishment,”	  because	   it	   is	  more	   just	  or	  more	  effective.11	  Tadros	  enjoins	  us	  to	  exercise	  caution.	  It	  will	  likely	  be	  very	  unusual	  for	  ordinary	  individuals’	   acts	   of	   punishment	   to	   be	   more	   just	   and	   more	   effective	   than	   states’	  punishments—even	  those	  of	  relatively	  unjust	  states—given	  the	  significantly	  more	  limited	  means	   of	   inquiry,	   publicity,	   sanction,	   etc.,	   at	   individuals’	   disposal.	   Moreover,	   given	   the	  importance	  of	  long-­‐term	  stability	  to	  a	  just	  society	  and	  the	  threat	  that	  widespread	  individual	  acts	  of	  punishment	  may	  pose	   to	   it,	   the	   threshold	  of	  state	   injustice	  and	   ineffectiveness	   for	  such	   acts	   to	   be	   justified	   will	   generally	   be	   exceptionally	   high.	   Here,	   one	   might	   wonder	  whether	   Tadros	   does	   not	   set	   this	   threshold	   too	   high:	   does	   he	   not	   underestimate	   that	  destabilization	   is	  sometimes	  required	  to	  remedy	   important	  state	  wrongdoing	  and	  foment	  the	   basis	   for	   justified	   rebellion?	   Regardless,	   his	   deeper	   point	   remains.	   Like	   inflictions	   of	  harm	  by	  ordinary	   individuals,	   state-­‐imposed	  harm	   in	  punishment	  requires	  general	  moral	  justification.	  	  
	  
II.	  THE	  GRAND	  AMBITIONS	  OF	  VICTOR’S	  JUSTICE 
 As	  morally	  discerning	  as	  Tadros’s	  theoretical	  approach	  may	  be	  in	  TEH,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  countless	   practical	   distinctions	   on	   which	   he	   is	   able	   to	   shed	   light,	   there	   is	   at	   least	   one	  general	  aspect	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not.	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  his	  tendency	  to	  articulate	  his	  argument	  in	  terms	   of	   one	   overarching	   moral	   metric,	   namely,	   justice.	   This	   tendency,	   reminiscent	   of	  grand	  value-­‐monist	  theories	  that	  assume	  the	  pervasive	  possibility	  of	  correct	  moral	  answers	  to	   apparent	  moral	   dilemmas	   and	   uniquely	   optimal	   social	   arrangements,	   generates	   some	  awkward	  tensions	  in	  his	  account.	  For	  one	  thing,	  even	  if	  injustice	  is	  often	  wrong—such	  that	  
                                                10	  Cf.	  Ripstein,	  Force	  and	  Freedom,	  supra	  note	  2,	  ch.	  11.	  	  11	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  pp.	  306-­‐307.	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   is	   “normally	   wrong	   to	   breach	   a	   just	   regulation”12—not	   all	   wrongdoing	   is	   an	   injustice.	  What	   is	   wrong	   with	   rape,	   torture,	   or	   enslavement	   is	   normally	   not	   that	   such	   forms	   of	  conduct	  are	  unjust,	   at	   least	   if	  we	  adhere	   to	   the	   common	  understanding	  of	   the	  domain	  of	  justice	  as	  concerned	  with	  allocative	  moral	  questions,	  such	  as	  who	  is	  to	  get	  what	  and	  how	  much	   of	   it.13	   Indeed,	   there	   are	   normally	   no	   questions,	   either	   of	   a	   comparative	   or	   non-­‐comparative	  nature,	  to	  be	  asked	  about	  who	  should	  be	  raped,	  about	  the	  proper	  grounds	  of	  enslavement,	   or	   about	   how	   much	   one	   should	   be	   tortured.	   There	   are	   normally	   no	   such	  questions	   because	   these	   forms	   of	   conduct	   are	   simply	   inhumane	   and,	   except	   perhaps	   in	  some	   rare	   tragic	   scenarios,	   the	  mere	   asking	   of	   allocative	   questions	   about	   them	   denotes	  moral	   confusion	   or,	   worse,	   grave	   insensitivity.14	   Here,	   I	   am	   not	   accusing	   Tadros	   of	  inhumanity,	  since	  he	  himself	  contends	  that	  what	  is	  fundamentally	  wrong	  with,	  say,	  rape	  is	  that	   it	  uses	  an	   individual	   in	  a	  way	   that	  disrespects	  her	   intrinsic	  value	  as	  an	  autonomous	  being.15	  Rather,	  I	  am	  rejecting	  the	  propensity	  of	  what	  I	  will	  call	  “Victor’s	  justice”	  to	  conflate	  distinct	   moral	   issues,	   such	   as	   sheer	   inhumane	   treatment	   and	   morally	   deficient	  allocations.16	  In	  fact,	  Victor’s	  justice	  is	  so	  capacious	  that	  one	  could	  perhaps	  be	  forgiven	  for	  mistakenly	  confusing	  it	  with	  morality	  writ	  large.	  	   I	   say	   that	   one	  would	   be	  mistaken	   in	   straightforwardly	   equating	   the	   two,	   since,	   in	  
TEH,	  Tadros	  is	  mostly	  concerned	  with	  duties	  which,	  although	  central	  to	  morality,	  constitute	  only	  one	  type	  of	  moral	  reasons—alongside,	  for	  example,	  pro	  tanto	  moral	  reasons.	  Still,	  the	  moral	   ambitions	   of	   Victor’s	   justice	   are	   sweeping.	   “[A]	   just	   world,”	   he	   insists,	   is	   really	  nothing	  less	  than	  “a	  world	  where	  everyone	  abides	  by	  their	  moral	  obligations.”17	  Statements	  of	  this	  sort	  are	  the	  source	  of	  much	  obfuscating	  inflation	  in	  TEH.	  A	  world	  in	  which	  all	  would	  abide	  by	  their	  moral	  duties	  not	  to	  rape	  or	  torture	  would	  certainly	  be	  a	  more	  humane	  world	  and,	   ceteris	   paribus,	   a	  morally	   better	  world.	   Yet,	   it	  would	   not	   necessarily	   be	   a	  more	   just	  world	   since,	   as	   I	   suggested,	   conformity	  with	   such	   duties	   generally	   involves	   no	   allocative	  moral	  issues.	  Even	  John	  Rawls,	  who	  makes	  more	  of	  justice	  than	  most	  in	  his	  work,	  is	  not	  as	  expansive	   as	   Tadros	   in	   his	   views.	   That	   is,	   even	   he	   makes	   clear	   that	   there	   is	   value	   in	  
                                                12	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  323.	  	  13	   See	   e.g.,	   Leslie	   Green,	   “The	   Germ	   of	   Justice”,	   Oxford	   Legal	   Studies	   Research	   Paper	   No.	   60/2010	   (2010),	  SSRN:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=	  1703008;	  John	  Gardner,	  “What	  is	  Tort	  Law	  For?	  Part	  1.	  The	  Place	  of	  Corrective	  Justice”	  Law	  and	  Philosophy	  30	  (2011):	  pp.	  1-­‐50	  at	  pp.	  6.	  	  14	  The	  rare	  tragic	  scenarios	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  are	  those	  in	  which,	  for	  example,	  the	  only	  possible	  way	  to	  prevent	  people	   being	   raped	   or	   enslaved	   is	   to	   rape	   or	   enslave	   others,	   or	   where	   the	   only	   possible	   way	   to	   prevent	  someone	  being	  tortured	  a	  lot	  is	  to	  torture	  another	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent.	  	  	  15	  See	  e.g.,	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  p.	  128.	  	  16	  See	  e.g.,	  ibid.,	  at	  p.	  105,	  where	  Tadros	  explicitly	  describes	  a	  failure	  to	  recognize	  someone’s	  status	  as	  a	  moral	  agent	  when	  harming	  them	  as	  an	  injustice.	  	  	  17	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  291.	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 conceiving	  of	  justice	  as	  a	  distinctive	  virtue,	  despite	  famously	  considering	  it	  to	  be	  “the	  first	  virtue”	  of	   social	   institutions.18	  Thus,	   for	  Rawls,	   a	  perfectly	   just	   society	   is	  not	   a	   society	   in	  which	  everyone	  abides	  by	  their	  moral	  duties	  writ	  large,	  but	  a	  society	  where	  duties	  of	  justice	  are	   strictly	   complied	   with.19	   True,	   like	   Tadros’s	   understanding	   of	   justice,	   Rawls’s	   is	  exclusively	  deontic,	  and	  neglects	  the	  possibility	  that	  we	  might	  have	  reasons	  to	  be	  just	  over	  and	  beyond	  the	  call	  of	  duty.	  Unlike	  Tadros’s,	  though,	  his	  understanding	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	   leaving	   the	   door	   open	   for	   a	   somewhat	  more	   textured	   and	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	  morality	  (despite	  its	  more	  institutional	  focus).	  It	  allows	  for	  a	  morality	  in	  which	  both	  justice-­‐based	   and	   non-­‐justice-­‐based	   duties,	   such	   as	   duties	   of	   sheer	   humanity,	   may	   coexist	   and,	  sometimes,	  even	  conflict	  irreconcilably—say,	  in	  tragic	  situations	  where	  the	  only	  way	  to	  be	  just	  would	  be	  inhumane,	  or	  the	  only	  way	  to	  be	  humane	  would	  be	  unjust.	  	  	   While	  some	  may	  want	   to	  dismiss	   this	  point	  of	  disagreement	  as	  a	  mere	  conceptual	  quibble,	   it	   does	   color	   Tadros’s	   entire	   argument.	   For	   example,	   he	   contends	   that	   when	  William	  successfully	  assaults	  David,	  what	  is	  saliently	  wrong	  about	  his	  conduct	  is	  that	  he	  has	  harmed	   David	   unjustly.20	   Insofar	   as	   an	   assault	   is	   partly	   constituted	   by	   the	   harm	   it	  occasions,	  one	  can	  see	  why	   it	  may	  be	   tempting	   to	  understand	   its	  wrongfulness	  along	   the	  spectrum	  of	   injustice.	  After	  all,	   one	  may	   think,	  harm,	  understood	  as	  a	  morally	   significant	  setback	  to	  interests,	  might	  be	  allocated.	  It	  might	  be	  allocated	  by	  courts	  which	  treat	  it	  as	  a	  cost	  to	  be	  endured	  by	  a	  specific	  individual	  or	  shared	  by	  many.	  It	  may	  also	  be	  allocated	  by	  soldiers	  who	   impose	   it	   on	   enemies.	   Even	   ordinary	   self-­‐defenders	  might	   allocate	   it	  when	  they	  opt	  to	  harm	  their	  assailants	  to	  avoid	  harm	  to	  themselves.	  Still,	  when	  harm	  is	  incurred	  as	   a	   result	   of	   human	   agency,	   and	   a	   suggestion	   is	   made	   that	   it	   was	   occasioned	   by	  wrongdoing,	   a	  question	  always	  arises	   about	   the	  kind,	   or	   ground,	   of	  wrongdoing	  at	   issue.	  Since	  the	  breach	  of	  a	  duty	  of	  justice	  is	  only	  one	  possible	  such	  ground,	  one	  might	  then	  query	  whether	   it	   is	   really	   the	   best	  way	   to	   understand	   the	  wrongfulness	   of	   assault.	   Should	   the	  wrongfulness	  of	  a	  random	  assault	  on	  the	  street,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  William’s	  attack	  on	  David,	  really	   be	   distilled	   to	   an	   allocative	   defect,	   either	   primarily	   or	   at	   all?	   The	   fact	   that	   many	  assaults—understood	   as	   non-­‐consensual	   intentional	   impositions	   of	   force—do	   not	   even	  result	  in	  significant	  harm	  certainly	  ought	  to	  give	  one	  pause.	  	  	   Tadros’s	   uncompromising	   insistence	   on	   framing	   such	   issues	   as	   issues	   of	   justice	   is	  question-­‐begging.	  Why	  persist	  in	  defending	  such	  a	  generic	  categorization	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  counter-­‐intuitive	  implications?	  One	  way	  to	  go	  about	  answering	  this	  question	  is	  to	  inquire	  into	  the	  place	  of	  justice	  in	  his	  argument.	  What	  seems	  clear	  is	  that	  Tadros’s	  overall	  project	  is	  not	  to	  produce	  a	  refined	  treatment	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  justice	  and	  its	  correct	  application.	  While	  the	  concept	  is	  omnipresent,	  it	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  sustained	  analysis.	  Rather,	  Tadros	  seems	  intent	   on	   developing	   a	   general	   framework	   for	   assessing	   the	   moral	   permissibility	   and	  obligatoriness	  of	  deliberate	   inflictions	  of	  harm,	  both	  at	   the	  hands	  of	  ordinary	   individuals	  and	  states.	  While	  the	  ultimate	  focus	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  on	  punishment,	  other	  inflictions	  of	  
                                                18	  John	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  Revised	  Edition	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  at	  p.	  3.	  	  19	  Ibid.,	  at	  pp.	  7-­‐8.	  	  20	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  p.	  284.	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NO.07] harm	  in	  self-­‐defense,	  armed	  combat,	  compensation,	  and	  so	  forth,	  also	  fall	  squarely	  within	  its	   remit.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   not	   too	   farfetched	   to	   posit	   that	   what	   Tadros	   primarily	   wants	   to	  demystify	   in	   TEH	   is	   that	   part	   of	   morality	   that	   bears	   on	   individual	   and	   state-­‐based	  allocations	  of	  harm.	  In	  fact,	  his	  goal	  seems	  to	  be	  to	  elucidate	  it	  as	  a	  unified	  and	  seamlessly	  coherent	   allocative	   system,	   of	   which	   “criminal	   justice”	   only	   forms	   one	   systemic	   subpart	  continuous	  with	  the	  rest.	  	  	  Many	   aspects	   of	   Tadros’s	   argument	   are	   consistent	  with	   this	   understanding	   of	   his	  project.	   For	   example,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   tremendous	   social	   resources	   and	  other	   human	   costs	  required	  for	  the	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  modern	  institutions	  of	  criminal	  law	  and	  punishment,	   he	   insists	   that	   their	   justification	   must	   be	   assessed	   in	   light	   of	   possible	  alternatives.	   “Suppose,”	   he	   ponders,	   “that	   expanding	   the	   system	   of	   compensation	  would	  make	  people	  better	  off	  than	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  using	  the	  same	  resources.”21	  Were	  this	   to	   be	   case,	   he	   suggests,	   institutions	   of	   criminal	   law	   and	   punishment	   would	   likely	  become	  impermissible	  as	  channels	  of	  harm	  allocation.	  For	  Tadros,	  this	  direct	  comparison	  is	  morally	  intelligible,	  because	  the	  imposition	  of	  harm	  in	  punishment	  is	  only	  one	  possible	  way	  of	  remedying	  harm	  that	  wrongdoers	  inflict	  on	  others.	  	  	  No	   doubt,	   punishment	   is	   a	   distinctive	   form	   of	   remediation.	   Punishments	   aim	   to	  inflict	  harm,	  and	  the	  harm	  aimed	  at	  is	  often	  particularly	  significant.	  Punishments	  also	  tend	  to	   have	   a	   strong	   condemnatory	   aspect.	   Thus,	   the	   practice	   is	   inevitably	   harsh,	   and	   its	  justification	  is	  generally	  held	  to	  require	  outstandingly	  robust	  safeguards	  for	  those	  who	  may	  suffer	   it.22	   Indeed,	  as	  Tadros	  stresses,	  we	   tend	  to	   think	  of	  punitive	  allocations	  of	  harm	  to	  innocents	  who	  have	  no	  obligation	   to	   incur	   it,	   or	   to	  wrongdoers	   in	  disproportion	  of	   their	  deeds,	   as	   especially	   unjust.23	   It	   is	   unsurprising,	   then,	   that	   he	   holds	   punishment	   to	   be	  justified	  only	  when	  other	   forms	  of	   remediation	  would	  be	   insufficient	  or	  unavailable,	   and	  the	  moment	  of	  justified	  pre-­‐emptive	  defense	  against	  harm	  has	  passed.	  Still,	  he	  insists	  that	  punishment	   primarily	   constitutes	   a	  means	   of	   remedying	   harm	   that	  must	   be	   understood	  along	  the	  same	  moral	  continuum	  as	  compensation.	  Punishments	  remedy	  harms	  wrongfully	  inflicted	  by	  harming	  wrongdoers	   in	  ways	   that	  prevent	   further	   impositions	  of	  such	  harms	  on	  their	  victims.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  For	  now,	  my	  aim	  is	  simply	  to	  make	  plain	  Tadros’s	  overall	  goal	  of	  accounting	  for	  criminal	  punishment	  as	  one	  tool	  amongst	  many	  for	  allocating	  harm,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  attempt	  to	  systematize	  the	  whole	  morality	  of	  harming	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  justice.	  	  This	  novel	  approach	  has	  important	  costs,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  what	  is	  lost,	  and	  perhaps	  confused,	  by	  assuming	  that	  all	  strands	  of	  the	  morality	  of	  harming	  are	  ultimately	  concerned	  
                                                21	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  344.	  	  22	  Ibid.,	  ch.	  14.	  	  23	  See	  e.g.,	  ibid.,	  at	  pp.	  138,	  314.	  	  
11                         VICTOR’S JUSTICE: THE NEXT BEST MORAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT? with,	   and	   can	   be	   reconciled	   under,	   the	   value	   of	   justice.	   What	   about	   the	   possibility	   that	  competing	  harm-­‐related	  desiderata—say,	  humanity	  and	  justice—may,	  as	  suggested	  earlier,	  conflict	  in	  incommensurable	  ways?	  Does	  Tadros’s	  unifying	  tendency	  not	  threaten	  to	  occult	  such	  critical	  conflicts?	  No	  doubt,	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  explanatory	  appeal	  to	  the	  tidiness	  of	  an	  approach	  according	  to	  which	  there	   is	  only	  ever	  one	  big	  moral	  puzzle	   to	  be	  assembled,	  as	  opposed	   to	  countless	  smaller	  ones	   that	  may	  not	   fit	   together	  neatly.	  Still,	  one	  cannot	  help	  but	   worry:	   does	   such	   an	   approach	   not	   run	   the	   risk	   of	   creating	   a	   false	   impression	   that	  perfect	  conciliation	  of	  competing	  values	   is	  always	  possible?	  At	   the	  broader	   level	  of	  social	  arrangements	   such	   as	   those	   of	   the	   criminal	   law,	   does	   it	   not	   run	   the	   risk	   of	   nurturing	  illusory	   promises	   of	   more	   uniquely	   optimal	   institutions	   and	   practices	   than	   are	   morally	  achievable?	  	  	  	  I	   am	   unsure	   whether	   Tadros	   truly	   conceives	   of	   the	   morality	   of	   harming	   as	   a	  seamlessly	  unified	  system	  in	  which	  practical	  conflicts	  and	  dilemmas	  are	  only	  superficially	  apparent,	  and	  ultimately	  resolvable	  in	  a	  uniquely	  correct	  way.	  That	  said,	   in	  TEH,	  Tadros’s	  justice-­‐driven	   reconciling	   instincts	   are	   dominant.	   Consider	   Kant’s	   oft-­‐cited	   hypothetical	  scenario	  in	  which	  two	  equally-­‐situated	  shipwrecked	  sailors	  struggle	  to	  survive	  by	  climbing	  on	  the	  sole	  remaining	  floating	  plank,	  which	  can	  only	  support	  one	  of	  them.	  One	  might	  think	  that	   due	   to	   a	   conflict	   of	   incommensurables—by	   hypothesis,	   two	   equally-­‐situated	   lives—morality’s	  guidance	  remains	  indeterminate	  as	  between	  them.	  Either	  each	  sailor	  is	  tragically	  bound	   to	   let	   go	   of	   the	   plank	   or	   act	   wrongly,	   all	   things	   considered,	   or	   each	   is	   equally	  permitted	   to	  use	  pre-­‐emptive	   force	  against	   the	  other.	  Tadros	  denies	   the	  existence	  of	  any	  such	   irresolvable	   symmetrical	   tension,	   insisting	   that	   a	   uniquely	   just	   resolution	   must	   be	  possible.	  What	  morality	  requires,	  he	  argues,	  is	  “to	  find	  a	  fair	  mechanism”	  for	  resolving	  the	  apparent	  conflict,	  “such	  as	  tossing	  a	  coin.”24	  One	  might	  question	  whether	  resort	  to	  chance	  by	  flipping	  a	  coin	  is	  really	  more	  just	  than	  leaving	  the	  outcome	  to	  be	  decided	  by	  the	  relative	  strengths	  bestowed	  on	  the	  protagonists	  by	  the	  fortunes	  of	  nature.	  For	  all	  I	  know,	  with	  some	  argument,	  Tadros	  might	  even	  be	  convinced	  that	  it	  is	  not,	  and	  that	  his	  egalitarian	  intuitions	  can	  at	  least	  sometimes	  be	  accommodated	  in	  the	  latter	  case.	  For	  example,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	   luck	  often	  has	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  one’s	  physical	  endowments	  as	  with	  the	  result	  of	  a	  coin	  toss.	  However,	  my	  main	  point	  is	  that,	  to	  persuade	  Tadros,	  the	  argument	  would	  likely	  have	  to	  be	  articulated	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  answer	  that	  justice	  requires,	  either	  substantively	  or	  procedurally.	  	  	  I	  say	  “likely,”	  because	  Tadros’s	  elevation	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  rank	  of	  master	  moral	  value	  is	   perhaps	   not	   as	   absolute	   as	   I	   make	   it	   to	   be.	   Justice	   is	   certainly	   a	   touchstone	   of	   his	  understanding	  of	  morality,	  but	  he	  also	  concedes	  at	  various	  points	  that	  it	  may	  have	  to	  take	  a	  back	  seat	  if	  something	  like	  a	  deadly	  nuclear	  explosion	  were	  to	  result	  from	  strict	  adherence	  to	  it.	  Then	  again,	  Tadros	  may	  simply	  be	  a	  threshold	  deontologist	  who,	  barring	  the	  heavens	  falling	   in	   such	  a	  way,	   is	   absolutely	   committed	   to	  a	   justice-­‐based	  morality.	  Admittedly,	  he	  does	   sometimes	   muse	   about	   the	   “rare”	   possibility	   of	   less	   extreme	   practical	   conflicts,	  involving	   the	   possibility	   of	   harming,	   for	   which	   there	   is	   no	   uniquely	   correct	   moral	  resolution.	   Such	   conflicts	   may	   exist	   when	   they	   are	   “either	   just”	   in	   themselves	   or,	   more	  
                                                24	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  p.	  216.	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NO.07] revealingly,	  when	  they	  are	  “in	  another	  way	  valuable.”25	  The	  sport	  of	  boxing	  may	  be	  such	  a	  case,	   given	   its	   instrumental	   entertainment	   value,	   and	   the	   intrinsic	   value	   residing	   in	   the	  displays	  of	  skill	  and	  strength	  involved.	  Still,	  one	  wonders	  whether	  the	  sport’s	  requirement	  that	  all	  boxers	  consent,	  within	  defined	  parameters,	  to	  being	  harmed	  may	  not	  allow	  him	  to	  recharacterize	  boxing	  as	  a	  just	  form	  of	  entertainment	  or	  as	  a	  just	  display	  of	  forceful	  skills—were	  he	  to	  be	  pressed	  on	  this	  issue	  in	  light	  of	  the	  current	  discussion.	  	  	  So	   it	   is	  unclear	   just	  how	  absolutely	  committed	  Tadros	   is	   to	   justice	  as	   the	  ultimate	  moral	   metric.	   What	   seems	   incontrovertible,	   though,	   is	   that	   he	   is	   strongly	   committed	   to	  articulating	  his	  argument	   in	  broad	  unifying	  terms.	  So	   far,	   I	  have	  conveyed	  my	  discomfort	  with	   this	   approach	   fairly	   generally.	   I	   now	   want	   to	   lay	   out	   some	   concerns	   specifically	  directed	  at	  how	  he	  develops	  his	  theory	  of	  punishment	  in	  light	  of	  this	  commitment.	  
 
III.	  THE	  NEXT	  BEST	  JUSTIFICATION	  OF	  PUNISHMENT?	  
 Tadros	   labels	   his	   theory	   of	   punishment	   “the	   duty	   view”	   because	   of	   its	   grounding	   in	   the	  duties	  that	  he	  understands	  wrongdoers	  to	  incur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  their	  wrongdoing.	  The	  theory	  takes	   roots	   in	   a	   self-­‐defensive	   scenario	   akin	   to	   the	   following.26	   Suppose	   that	   Anna	  wrongfully	   hires	   a	   hit	  man	   to	   shoot	   off	   Blake’s	   right	   arm	   and	   leg.	   Tadros	   argues	   that	   it	  would	  be	  permissible	  for	  Blake	  to	  pull	  Anna	  in	  front	  of	  him	  to	  use	  her	  as	  a	  shield	  against	  her	  hit	  man’s	  bullets,	  insofar	  as	  this	  maneuver	  is	  necessary	  for	  him	  to	  avoid	  being	  seriously	  harmed.	  Blake	  is	  permitted	  do	  so	  because	  Anna	  has	  a	  general	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  him,	  and	  the	  only	   way	   for	   her	   to	   fulfill	   that	   duty	   is	   now	   to	   shield	   him	   from	   the	   threat	   she	   culpably	  created.	  Normally,	  Tadros	  concedes,	   it	   is	   impermissible	   intentionally	  to	  use	  someone	  else	  as	  a	  means	  to	  a	  further	  goal,	  such	  as	  self-­‐protection—and	  perhaps	  even	  more	  starkly	  so	  if	  that	   someone	   is	   to	   be	   seriously	   harmed	   in	   the	   process.	   However,	   he	   does	   not	   think	   this	  categorical	  prohibition	  is	  exceptionless:	  it	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  cases	  where	  the	  person	  to	  be	  harmfully	  used	  already	  has	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  fulfill	  the	  further	  goal	  in	  question,	  such	  as	  an	  enforceable	  duty	  to	  provide	  protection.	  	  	   Tadros	  maintains	  that	  Anna’s	  duty	  to	  shield	  Blake	  from	  her	  hit	  man’s	  bullets	  is	  one	  such	  enforceable	  duty,	  given	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  harm	  that	  Blake	  would	  incur	  were	  she	  to	   fail	   to	   discharge	   her	   duty,	   and	   the	   improbability	   that	   he	   could	   be	   compensated	  adequately	   ex	   post	   facto.	   To	   be	   sure,	   while	   innocent	   bystanders	   may	   sometimes	   have	  enforceable	  duties	  to	  rescue	  people	  from	  harm,	  such	  duties	  tend	  not	  to	  extend	  to	  shielding	  people	   from	  bullets.	  They	  do	  not	  extend	   to	  such	  heroic	   feats	  because	  of	   the	  considerable	  personal	   costs—including	   harm	   to	   self—that	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   incurred	   in	   the	   process.	  However,	   a	   culpable	   wrongdoer	   like	   Anna	   generally	   cannot	   complain	   of	   such	   costs.	   She	  
                                                25	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  214-­‐215.	  	  26	  See	  especially	  ibid.,	  ch.	  12.	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   complain	   because	   these	   costs	   would	   be	   incurred	   as	   part	   of	   preventing	   the	  realization	  of	  a	  threat	  that	  she	  had	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  create,	  chose	  to	  create,	  could	  have	  avoided	  creating	   at	   no	  moral	   costs	   to	   herself,	   and	   now	   has	   a	   derivative	   duty	   to	   negate—barring	  which,	   the	   person	   to	   whom	   the	   duty	   is	   owed	   will	   suffer	   serious	   harm,	   unlikely	   to	   be	  adequately	  compensated.	   In	  other	  words,	  once	  Anna	  cannot	  call	  off	   the	  wrongful	  hit	   that	  she	  culpably	  ordered,	  she	  is	  under	  a	  duty	  to	  do	  the	  next	  best	  thing—namely,	  to	  shield	  Blake	  from	  it—and	  Blake	  is	  permitted	  to	  harm	  her	  to	  enforce	  it.	  	  	  	   Now,	  suppose	  that	  the	  hit	  man	  is	  successful	  and	  Blake’s	  right	  arm	  and	  leg	  have	  been	  shot	  off.	  Tadros	  maintains	  that	  Anna’s	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  him	  is	  not	  extinguished	  as	  a	  result.	  Rather,	   her	   duty	   becomes	   a	   duty	   to	   do	   what	   is	   now	   the	   next	   best	   thing.	   What	   is	   that?	  Tadros’s	  answer,	  which	  lies	  at	  the	  core	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  punishment,	  is	  rather	  unexpected.	  Suppose	   that	  Claire	  attacks	  Blake	  and	   is	  about	   to	  shoot	  off	  his	  other	  arm	  and	   leg.	  Tadros	  thinks	   that	  since	  Anna	  now	  cannot	  stand	   in	   the	  way	  of,	  or	  otherwise	  undo,	   the	  harm	  she	  occasioned,	   she	   owes	   it	   to	   Blake	   to	   protect	   him	   from	   relevantly	   similar	   harming.	   Thus,	  protecting	  Blake	  from	  Claire’s	  attack	  is	  the	  next	  best	  thing	  Anna	  can	  do.	  It	  is	  the	  next	  best	  thing,	   since	   it	  would	   put	   Blake	   in	   as	   close	   as	   possible	   a	   position	   as	   the	   one	   in	  which	   he	  would	   have	   been	   had	   Anna	   initially	   complied	  with	   her	   duty.	   Had	   Anna	   not	   ordered	   the	  shooting	  of	  Blake’s	  right	  arm	  and	  leg,	  he	  would	  only	  have	  incurred	  harm	  to	  his	  left	  arm	  and	  leg	   at	   Claire’s	   hands.	   Thus,	   all	   else	   being	   equal,	   by	   protecting	   Blake	   from	   Claire,	   Anna	  ensures	  that	  Blake	  will	  only	  have	   incurred	  harm	  to	  one	  arm	  and	  one	   leg,	  almost	  as	   if	  she	  had	  not	  attacked	  him.	  	  	   Here,	  Tadros	  again	  argues	  that	  were	  Anna	  to	  be	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  rescue	  Blake	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  latter	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  harm	  her	  to	  get	  her	  to	  do	  her	  duty	  to	  protect	  him.	  He	  would	  be	  permitted	  to	  do	  so	  given	  the	  enforceable	  character	  of	  Anna’s	  duty	  to	  bear	  that	  degree	  of	  harm—assuming,	  once	  again,	   that	  performance	  of	  her	  duty	   is	  necessary	  to	  protect	  him	  from	  great	  harm	  and	  that	  other	  compensation	  would	  be	  either	  inadequate	  or	  unlikely	   to	   be	   forthcoming.	   In	   other	   words,	   Blake	   would	   be	   permitted	   to	   harmfully	   use	  Anna	   for	   protection	   if	   that	   were	   the	   only	   way	   to	   remedy,	   or	   rectify,	   the	   harm	   that	   she	  wrongfully	  caused	   to	  him.	  Tadros	  presents	   this	  explanation	  as	   the	   foundation	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  his	  remedial	   justification	  of	  punishment.	  Punishment,	  one	  may	  think,	  consists	   in	   the	  intentional	  infliction	  of	  harm	  to	  someone	  in	  response	  to	  wrongdoing	  (or,	  at	  least,	  to	  what	  is	  alleged,	   even	   if	   disingenuously,	   to	   constitute	   wrongdoing).	   At	   the	   core	   of	   Tadros’s	  argument	   is	   the	   thought	   that	   such	   a	   practice	   can	   be	   justified	   as	   a	   means	   of	   compelling	  actual	  wrongdoers	  to	  remedy	  the	  harm	  they	  culpably	  occasioned	  to	  their	  victims.	  	  	   As	  I	  said,	  though,	  the	  decision	  to	  ground	  this	  argument	  in	  the	  principle	  of	  “next	  best”	  conformity	   to	   reasons	   is	   surprising.	   It	   is	   surprising	   since,	   historically,	   champions	   of	   this	  principle	   of	   rationality	   have	   been	   staunchly	   opposed	   to	   its	   extension	   to	   punishment.	  Articulated	   in	  deontic	   terms,	   to	  mirror	  Tadros’s	  own	  understanding,	   the	  principle	   stands	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  when	  we	  fail	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  duty	  that	  we	  owe	  someone,	  and	  it	  is	  too	  late	  to	  reverse	  course	  and	  conform,	  we	  still	  owe	  that	  person	  something.	  We	  owe	  it	  to	  her	  to	  put	  her	  back,	  so	  far	  as	  we	  can,	  in	  the	  position	  in	  which	  she	  would	  have	  been	  had	  we	  conformed	  with	  our	  primary	  duty.	  To	  paraphrase	  Joseph	  Raz,	  we	  incur	  a	  secondary	  duty	  to	  compensate	  her—insofar	  as	  compensation	   is	  understood	  as	   rendering	  an	  equivalence,	  or	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  near	  an	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  as	  can	  be,	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  primary	  duty.27	  Thus,	  when	  the	  primary	  duty	  breached	  is	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  others,	  a	  question	  always	  arises	  about	  how	  the	  duty	  violator	  (aka	  wrongdoer)	  can	  best	  compensate	  his	  victim	  for	  the	  harm	  she	  incurred.	  This	  question	  is	  a	  question	  of	  corrective	   justice—that	   is	  to	  say,	  a	  question	  about	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  wrongdoer	  should	  seek	  to	  “make-­‐up”	  for	  his	  failure	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  duty	  he	  owed	   his	   victim	   and,	   thus,	   attempt	   to	   counteract	   his	   deed.	   This	   way	   of	   thinking	   about	  punishment	   fits	   seamlessly	   within	   Tadros’s	   overall	   justice-­‐based	   approach.	   Still,	   any	  attempt	   to	  characterize	   the	   justification	  of	  punishment	  as	  a	  question	  of	  corrective	   justice	  encounters	  powerful	  objections.	  	  	   The	   most	   oft-­‐cited	   objection	   is	   that,	   unlike	   compensation,	   punishment	   is	   not	  something	  that	   the	  wrongdoer	  owes,	  because	   it	   is	  not	  something	  that	   the	  wrongdoer	  can	  give.	  In	  John	  Gardner’s	  words,	  “It	  is	  something	  that	  is	  inflicted	  upon	  him	  by	  others,	  and	  the	  norms	   regulating	   it	   belong,	   in	   the	   final	   analysis,	   to	   their	   normative	   position	   and	   not	   to	  his.”28	   This	   punishment-­‐cannot-­‐be-­‐given	   (PCBG)	   objection	   is	   overkill,	   and	   must	   be	  considerably	  refined	   if	   it	   is	   to	  have	  any	  bite	  against	  Tadros’s	  argument.	  For	  example,	  one	  may	  conceivably	  give	  oneself	  punishment	  for	  breaching	  a	  self-­‐regarding	  duty.	  Consider	  the	  case	  of	  Deepti	  who	  punishes	  herself	  for	  a	  broken	  self-­‐made	  promise	  to	  study	  diligently	  for	  a	  failed	  exam	  by	  cancelling	  all	  her	  subsequent	  recreational	  outings.	  One	  may	  also	  give	  oneself	  punishment	   for	  breaching	  duties	  owed	   to	  others.	  Thus,	   a	   voluntary	   jump	  by	  Anna	   in	   the	  way	  of	  Claire’s	  bullets	  can	  easily	  be	  interpreted	  as	  Anna	  punishing	  herself	  for	  breaching	  her	  duty	   not	   to	   harm	  Blake.	   The	  PCBG	  objection	  may	   seem	   to	   have	  more	   teeth	   in	   this	   latter	  case.	  Even	  if	  we	  concede	  that	  Anna	  can	  give	  herself	  punishment	  by	  jumping	  in	  the	  way	  of	  Claire’s	  bullets,	   isn’t	   this	  punishment,	  by	  definition,	  aimed	  at	  herself,	   so	   that	   it	   cannot	  be	  given	  to	  the	  person	  to	  whom	  she	  owes	  compensation?	  Not	  so	  fast.	  Insofar	  as	  Anna	  punishes	  herself	  as	  a	  means	  of	  shielding	  Blake	   from	  Claire’s	  bullets,	  her	  self-­‐punishment	  does	  give	  Blake	   something	   meaningful:	   it	   gives	   him	   protection	   against	   wrongful	   harm	   he	   would	  otherwise	  incur.	  So,	  Anna’s	  punitive	  sacrifice	  may	  be	  intended	  as,	  and	  yield,	  compensation	  for	  Blake.	  	  	  An	   intuitively	  more	  promising	   focus	  might	  be	  on	  cases	   in	  which	   the	  wrongdoer	   is	  unwilling	  or	  unable	  to	  punish	  herself,	  so	  that	  punishment	  can	  only	  be	  inflicted	  on	  her	  by	  a	  third	  party.	  Such	  cases	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  Tadros	  ultimately	  wants	  to	  justify,	  since	  they	  are	  relevantly	  closer	  to	  state-­‐imposed	  criminal	  punishment.	  In	  such	  scenarios,	  one	  might	  think,	  punishment	  is,	  by	  definition,	  not	  given,	  but	  forced	  upon	  the	  wrongdoer.	  Here	  again,	  though,	  the	  objection	   fails	   since	   the	   same	  might	  be	   said	  of	  other	   forms	  of	   compensation	   that	   are	  
                                                27	  Joseph	  Raz,	  “Personal	  Practical	  Conflicts”,	  in	  Peter	  Baumann	  and	  Monika	  Betzler	  (eds.),	  Practical	  Conflicts:	  
New	  Philosophical	  Essays	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  pp.	  172-­‐194,	  at	  p.	  191,	  fn	  25.	  	  28	   John	   Gardner,	   “Punishment	   and	   Compensation:	   a	   Comment”,	   in	   Russell	   Christopher	   (ed.),	   George	   P	  
Fletcher's	   Essays	   on	   Criminal	   Law	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	   Press	   forthcoming),	   online	   at:	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1837373.	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  not	  conceived	  as	  punitive,	  such	  as	  compensatory	  pecuniary	  damages	  in	  tort	   law.	  Civil	   defendants	   may	   be	   equally	   unwilling	   to	   pay	   the	   pecuniary	   damages	   they	   owe	   in	  compensation.	   When	   this	   happens,	   their	   payment	   of	   damages	   may	   be	   enforced,	   say,	   by	  garnishment	  of	   their	  earnings	  or	  bank	  accounts.	  The	  relevant	  point	   is	   that,	   in	  both	  cases,	  individuals	   have	   an	   enforceable	   duty	   to	   provide	   compensation	   in	   a	   given	   way,	   which	  undermines	  the	  complaint	  they	  would	  otherwise	  have	  about	  being	  harmfully	  used	  for	  this	  further	  goal.	  Civil	  defendants	  must	  pay	  the	  compensatory	  damages	  they	  owe,	  failing	  which	  they	   may	   suffer	   seizure	   of	   their	   assets.	   Similarly,	   Tadros	   tells	   us,	   culpable	   wrongdoers	  unwilling	  or	  unable	   to	  prevent	   further	  harm	  to	   their	  victims	  have	  an	  enforceable	  duty	   to	  submit	  to	  being	  harmfully	  used	  for	  their	  protection.	  	  	   The	  PCBG	  objection	   is	  only	   successful,	   I	   think,	   if	  we	  understand	   it	   as	   taking	   issue,	  more	  modestly,	  with	  Tadros’s	  wider	  claim	  that	   the	  protection	  that	  a	  wrongdoer	  owes	  his	  victim	  may	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  general	  deterrence	  effect	  of	  his	  punishment.	  His	  claim	  takes	  the	  following	  form.	  If	  Blake	  is	  permitted	  to	  harm	  Anna	  punitively	  by	  forcing	  her	  to	  shield	  him	  physically	   from	  Claire’s	  bullets,	   he	   is	   also	  permitted	   to	  harm	  Anna	   in	  different	  ways	  that	  would	  deter	  Claire	  from	  attacking	  him	  altogether.	  For	  example,	  Blake	  may	  punish	  Anna	  in	  ways	  that	  will	  lead	  Claire	  to	  fear	  sufficiently	  that	  he	  would	  punish	  her	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  were	   she	   to	   attack	   him,	   that	   she	   will	   opt	   to	   desist	   from	   it.	   The	   permissibility	   of	   such	  deterrent	  punishment	  seems	  to	  follow	  seamlessly	  from	  the	  permissibility	  of	  punishment	  in	  the	  forced	  shielding	  scenario.	  Yet,	  Tadros’s	  claim	  goes	  further.	  He	  contends	  that	  if	  Blake’s	  punishment	   of	   Anna	   is	   not	   aimed	   at	   deterring	   a	   specific	   wrongdoer	   like	   Claire,	   but	   at	  anybody	  who,	  more	   generally,	  may	  wrongfully	   harm	   him	   in	   a	   similar	  way	   in	   the	   future,	  then	  he	   is	  also	  permitted	  to	  punish	  her	   for	  this	  reason.	  He	  may	  punish	  her	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
general	  deterrence.	  	  	   As	  Tadros	  notes,	  the	  question	  of	  general	  deterrence	  most	  often	  arises	  in	  the	  context	  of	  state	  punishment.	  That	  is	  because	  general	  deterrence	  relies	  on	  punishment	  being	  public,	  and	   states	   are	   typically	   more	   effective	   than	   individuals	   at	   ensuring	   that	   punishment	  reaches	  a	  wider	  audience	  and	  that	   this	  audience	  believes	   that	   it	  has	   the	  power	   to	  punish	  them	   for	   future	   wrongdoing.29	   This	   point	   forms	   part	   of	   Tadros’s	   wider	   argument	   that,	  although	   punishment	   of	   a	   culpable	   wrongdoer	   is	   centrally	   owed	   to	   those	   whom	   he	   has	  wrongfully	  harmed,	  the	  state	  is	  often	  permitted,	  and	  best	  placed,	  to	  act	  as	  punisher	  on	  their	  behalf.	   It	  may	  so	  act	  either	  with	  victims’	   consent	  or	  without	   it,	   to	   the	  extent	   that	  victims	  have	  a	  duty	  of	  self-­‐respect	  to	  consent	  to	  it,	  or	  a	  duty	  to	  rescue	  others	  from	  wrongful	  harm	  by	  allowing	  the	  state	  to	  deter	  other	  wrongdoers	  through	  punishment	  (at	   little	  cost	  to	  the	  victims	   themselves).30	   I	   do	   not	   wish	   to	   say	   any	   more	   about	   these	   arguments,	   or	   about	  Tadros’s	  more	  complex	  arguments	  concerning	  states’	  duties	  to	  punish	  wrongdoers	  and	  the	  precedence	  of	   their	  permission	   to	  do	  so.	  My	  aim	  here	   is	  merely	   to	  note	   that	   they	  all	   rest	  primarily	  on	  the	  permissibility	  of	  punishing	  culpable	  wrongdoers	  to	  deter	  generally	  further	  wrongful	  harm	  to	  their	  victims.	  	  
                                                29	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  p.	  304.	  	  30	  Ibid.,	  at	  pp.	  294-­‐299.	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   Indeed,	   for	   Tadros,	   the	   protection	   afforded	   to	   victims	   by	   the	   general	   deterrence	  effect	  of	  state	  punishment	  lies	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  justification	  of	  this	  institutional	  practice.	  In	  most	   contemporary	   societies,	   he	   assumes,	   this	   effect	   plays	   a	   “powerful”	   and	   “significant”	  role	   in	   ensuring	   that	   people	   do	   not	   develop	   inclinations	   to	   wrong	   others.31	   Without	   it,	  “many	   more	   people”	   would	   develop	   such	   inclinations,	   resulting	   in	   much	   more	   harmful	  wrongdoing.32	  The	  problem	  with	  such	  an	  undefended	  empirical	  claim	  is	  that	   it	   leaves	  the	  reader	   to	   wonder	   how	   measurable	   the	   general	   deterrence	   effect	   of	   specific	   acts	   of	  punishment	   really	   is	   and,	   insofar	   it	   can	  be	  measured,	   how	  much	  each	  punishment	   really	  contributes	   to	   general	   deterrence.	  We	  may	   agree	   with	   Tadros	   that	   the	   practice	   of	   state	  punishment	  has	  at	  least	  some	  general	  deterrence	  effect	  in	  society.	  However,	  if	  we	  cannot	  at	  least	   roughly	   identify	   how	   much	   deterrence,	   and	   deterrence	   of	   whom,	   is	   generated	   by	  specific	   punishments	   of	   particular	   wrongdoers	   then	   we	   cannot	   assess	   whether	   these	  punishments	   constitute	   sufficient	   remediation	   for	   their	   victims.	   Although	   primarily	  empirical,	   this	   problem	   has	   serious	   ramifications	   for	   the	   appeal	   of	   Tadros’s	   theory.	   If,	  according	  to	  the	  core	  justificatory	  case	  for	  the	  punishment	  of	  wrongdoers,	  a	  punitive	  act	  is	  permissible	  only	  when	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  serious	  harm	  to	  their	  victims,	  then	  we	  need	  a	  plausible	  way	  to	  assess	  such	  necessity.	  Otherwise,	  we	  end	  up	  with	  a	  very	  abstract,	  not	  to	  say	   wishful,	   justificatory	   case	   for	   punishment,	   not	   unlike	   cases	   grounded	   in	   the	   idea	   of	  desert,	   which	   Tadros	   otherwise	   decries	   on	   similar	   grounds.	   One	  way	   to	   get	   around	   this	  problem	  may	  be	  to	  contend	  that	  it	  is	  the	  deterrence	  effect	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  punishment	  as	  a	  whole—in	  which,	  past	  a	  certain	  point,	  individual	  acts	  of	  punishment	  may	  or	  may	  not	  play	  a	   role—that	   ought	   to	   be	   the	   locus	   of	   assessment.	  However,	   this	   concession	  would	   entail	  that	  state	  punishments	  are	  not,	  as	  Tadros	  argues,	  to	  be	  justified	  as	  ways	  for	  each	  punished	  wrongdoer	  to	  correct	  his	  breach	  of	  duty,	  since	  no	  actual	  deterrence	  may	  be	  provided—or	  “given”—by	  his	  specific	  punishment.	  	  	   Insofar	   as	   Tadros	   wants	   to	   resist	   this	   concession,	   he	   must	   answer	   the	   following	  question:	   do	   states	   have	   a	   potentially	   very	   onerous	   duty	   to	   develop	   effective	   systems	   to	  assess	  the	  probable	  deterrence	  effect	  of	  each	  punishment	  they	  imposed,	  and	  to	  refrain	  from	  punishing	  whenever	   this	   effect	   is	   negligible?	   I	   believe	   he	  would	   be	   reluctant	   to	   embrace	  such	   a	   possibility,	   given	   the	   considerable	   other	   social	   costs	   which,	   he	   repeatedly	  emphasizes,	   must	   already	   be	   expanded	   to	   sustain	   modern	   institutions	   of	   criminal	  punishment,	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  monitoring	  with	  precision	  the	  many	  subtle	  and	  long	  term	  effects	  of	  these	  institutions.	  Rather,	  his	  response	  in	  TEH	  seems	  to	  be,	  in	  part,	  that,	  although	  general	   deterrence	   is	   the	   only	   thing	   that	   could	   plausibly	   justify	   using	   significant	   state	  resources	  to	  develop	  and	  maintain	  institutions	  of	  state	  punishment,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  exclusive	   justification	   for	   such	   punishment.	   Once	   such	   institutions	   are	   set	   up,	   it	   then	  becomes	   permissible	   to	   harm	  wrongdoers	   in	   punishment	   for	   the	   further	   goal	   of	   leading	  
                                                31	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  281.	  	  32	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  282.	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  to	  recognize	  the	  wrongfulness	  of	  their	  conduct.33	  Thus,	  recognition	  may	  pick	  up	  as	  a	  justification	  where	  deterrence	  is	  missing.	  	  	  This	   rejoinder	   is	   problematic.	   First,	   it	   is	   unclear	   that	   institutions	   of	   state	  punishment	  can	  even	  be	  calibrated	  to	  ensure	  that	  most,	  let	  alone	  all,	  punitive	  acts	  generate	  sufficient	   general	   deterrence	   to	   discharge	   punished	   wrongdoers’	   specific	   duties	   of	  protection	  to	  their	  victims.	  If	  that	  is	  true,	  then	  state	  punishment	  is	  markedly	  deficient	  as	  a	  means	   of	   inter	   partes	   compensatory	   remediation.	   So,	   recognition	   may	   have	   a	   lot	   more	  justificatory	   slack	   to	   pick	   up	   than	   it	   can	   handle—or,	   at	   least,	   that	   Tadros	   thinks	   it	   can	  handle—since	   he	   holds	   that	   “we	   should	   not	   be	   too	   confident	   about	   the	   ability	   of	   our	  institutions	   to	   achieve	   recognition	   and	   reconciliation.	   Criminal	   justice	   has	   typically	   fared	  very	  poorly	  in	  that	  regard.”34	  So	  Tadros’s	  recognition	  argument	  may	  not	  provide	  sufficient	  support	  to	  his	  general	  deterrence	  argument	  to	  prevent	  him	  from	  having	  to	  endorse	  a	  much	  more	  abolitionist	  stance	  about	  state	  punishment	  than	  he	  otherwise	  seems	  willing	  to	  do	  in	  
TEH.	   	  	   Tadros	  may	  have	  another	  partial	  reply	  up	  his	  sleeve,	  since	  he	  also	  argues	  that	  “[i]t	  is	  permissible	  to	  harm	  an	  offender	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  is	  necessary	  fully	  to	  compensate	  the	   victim	   for	   having	   been	   wronged.”35	   Insofar	   as	   he	   is	   right,	   it	   may	   be	   permissible	   to	  punish	   wrongdoers	   in	   ways	   that,	   generally,	   have	   more	   powerful	   deterrent	   effects	   than	  mere	  compensation	  would	  allow.	  While	  greater	  punishments	  will	  not	  always	  translate	  into	  greater	   general	   deterrence,	   and	   greater	   deterrence	   does	   not	   guarantee	   that	   all	   state	  punishments	  of	  wrongdoers	  will	  provide	  adequate	  compensation	  to	  their	  specific	  victims,	  cases	  of	   insufficient	   inter	  partes	  remediation	   could	  well	  be	   lower	  as	  a	   result.	  Admittedly,	  this	  reply	  does	  not	  answer	  my	  objection	  fully,	  but	  it	  can	  at	  least	  weaken	  it	  somewhat.	  	   Unfortunately,	   the	   additional	   claim	   is	   also	   problematic	   for	   Tadros’s	   account:	   it	  seems	   to	   represent	   an	   important	   shift	   in	   his	   argumentative	   strategy	   away	   from	   his	  otherwise	   central	   concern	   for	   the	   next-­‐best	   thing	   that	   wrongdoers	   owe	   their	   victims.	  Consider	   his	   explanation.	   If	   Anna	   does	   not	   bear	   any	   significant	   cost	   in	   protecting	   Blake	  from	   Claire’s	   attack—say,	   she	   happens	   to	   be	   wearing	   a	   bullet-­‐proof	   outfit—she	   cannot	  claim	  that	  she	  has	  fulfilled	  her	  corrective	  duty	  to	  Blake.	  For	  she	  only	  does	  what	  her	  generic	  duty	   to	  rescue	  him	  already	  requires	  of	  her,	   independently	  of	  her	  wrongdoing.	  Until	  Anna	  incurs	  a	  cost	  that	  she	  would	  not	  have	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  incur	  were	  it	  not	  for	  her	  wrongdoing,	  her	  enforceable	  duty	  of	  protection	  remains.	  Yet,	   to	  whom	   is	   this	  extra	  duty	  of	  protection	  owed,	  now	  that,	  according	  to	  Tadros,	  Anna,	  having	  protected	  Blake	  from	  Claire’s	  attack,	  has	  made	  him	  virtually	  as	  well	  off	  as	  he	  would	  have	  been	  had	  he	  not	  been	  wronged	  by	  her	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  Anna	  owes	  it	  to	  Blake	  to	  provide	  him	  with	  protection	  against	   further	   wrongful	   harms.	   Tadros	   is	   sympathetic	   to	   this	   possibility,	   sometimes	  emphasising	   that	   his	   additional	   argument	   is	   not	  meant	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	   the	   otherwise	  
                                                33	  Ibid.,	  at	  pp.	  283-­‐286.	  	  34	  Ibid.,	  at	  pp.	  285,	  108.	  	  35	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  286.	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NO.07] compensatory	  basis	  of	  his	  theory.	  Rather,	  it	  provides	  a	  complementary	  explanation	  for	  why	  it	  may	   sometimes	   be	   permissible	   to	   punish	   over	   and	   above	   the	   cap	   of	   compensation.	   At	  other	  times,	  though,	  Tadros	  appears	  to	  recognize	  the	  pressure	  that	  his	  additional	  argument	  puts	   on	   his	   inter	   partes	   rectificatory	   framework.	   Thus,	   at	   the	   conference	   leading	   to	   this	  symposium,	   he	   suggested	   that	   once	   state	   punishment	   of	   a	   wrongdoer	   has	   fully	  compensated	   her	   victim,	   any	   additional	   deterrence	   benefits	   might	   permissibly	   be	  distributed	  more	  evenly	  amongst	  other	  potential	  victims	  of	  crime.	  	  	  Admittedly,	   Tadros	   still	   emphasizes	   the	   compensatory	   basis	   of	   punishment.	  However,	  when	  analysed	  alongside	  other	  arguments	   scattered	  across	  TEH,	   his	   additional	  distributive	  suggestion	  may	  also	  be	  taken	  as	  one	  of	  many	  indications	  that	  his	  commitment	  to	  this	  basis	  is	  unstable.	  For	  example,	  he	  argues	  that	  what	  a	  culpable	  wrongdoer	  owes	  her	  victim	  lessens	  over	  time,	  as	  “the	  connection	  between	  the	  person	  as	  they	  are	  now	  and	  the	  person	   who	   committed	   the	   offence	   weakens.”36	   This	   line	   of	   argument	   suggests	   that	   the	  extent	  of	  burdens	   that	  a	  wrongdoer	  may	  permissibly	  suffer	   in	  punishment	   is	  much	  more	  central	   to	   Tadros’s	   account	   than	   actual	   compensation	   of	   her	   victim.	   Indeed,	   were	  punishment	   to	   be	   extremely	   costly	   to	   the	  wrongdoer	   relative	   to	   the	  wrongful	   harm	   she	  inflicted,	  Tadros	  would	  likely	  hold	  it	  to	  be	  disproportionate	  and,	  thus,	  impermissible,	  even	  if	  the	  victim	  were	  left	  uncompensated	  as	  a	  result.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Tadros	  is	  also	  adamant	  that	   the	   upper	   cap	   of	   permissible	   punishment	   differs	   from,	   and	   will	   often	   exceed,	  compensation.	  Ergo,	  how	  central	  really	  is	  compensation	  to	  the	  justification	  of	  punishment?	  	  Tadros’s	  acknowledgment	  that	   inchoate	  wrongdoers	  may	  permissibly	  be	  punished	  accentuates	  this	  tension.	  It	  may	  be	  true,	  as	  he	  argues,	  that	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  why	  such	  wrongdoers	  may	  be	  punished	  is	  that	  they	  bear	  partial	  responsibility	  for	  the	  harms	   that	   people	   suffer	   from	   other	   completed	   crimes.	   They	   bear	   such	   responsibility	  because	  they	  are	  a	   threat	   to	  us,	  a	   threat	   that	  we	  must	  expend	  resources	   in	  averting,	   thus	  decreasing	  the	  resources	  that	  we	  have	  to	  prevent	  other	  crimes.37	  Yet,	  since,	  by	  definition,	  inchoate	   wrongs	   have	   no	   direct	   victims,	   it	   is	   unclear	   to	   whom	   punishment	   of	   such	  wrongdoers	   is	  owed	  as	  a	  next-­‐best	   thing.	   If	   it	   is	  owed	   to	  society	  as	  whole—that	   is,	   to	  all	  potential	   victims	   of	   crime—then	   one	   is	   again	   left	   to	   wonder	   whether	   inter	   partes	  compensation	   really	   occupies	   the	   foundational	   position	   that	   Tadros	   otherwise	   claims	   it	  does	  in	  his	  theory.	  	  At	   one	   point,	   Tadros	   even	   seems	   to	   concede	   inadvertently	   that	   a	   “stronger”	  justification	   for	   state	   punishment	   may	   be	   grounded	   in	   the	   special	   duty	   of	   equality	   that	  citizens	  owe	  to	  each	  other.38	  For	  all	   I	  know,	  this	  alternative	  argument	  might	  allow	  him	  to	  elude	  my	  earlier	  objection	  linked	  to	  general	  deterrence.	  That	  is,	  he	  might	  be	  able	  to	  argue	  
                                                36	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  308.	  	  37	  Ibid.,	  at	  pp.	  287-­‐288,	  325-­‐326.	  	  38	  Ibid.,	  at	  p.	  311.	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   even	  when	  wrongdoers’	   punishments	   add	   no	   general	   deterrence	   to	  what	   is	   already	  otherwise	  provided	  by	  their	  state’s	  practice	  of	  punishment,	  they	  still	  have	  a	  duty	  of	  equality	  to	  undergo	  punishment	  just	  like	  those	  whose	  punishment	  has	  an	  actual	  deterrent	  effect—perhaps	  more	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  luck	  than	  anything	  else.	  However,	  in	  TEH,	  Tadros	  deliberately	  eludes	  this	  line	  of	  argument,	  whose	  focus	  is	  much	  less	  on	  inter	  partes	  corrective	  concerns	  than	   on	   the	   broader	   issue	   of	   the	   fair	   distribution	   of	   the	   ills	   (and	   goods)	   of	   punishment	  amongst	   citizens	   in	   society.	   Thus,	   in	   what	   follows,	   I	   take	   Tadros	   at	   his	   (admittedly	  ambiguous)	  word,	  disregard	  this	   troubling	  alternative	  proposal,	  and	  continue	  to	   focus	  on	  his	  so-­‐called	  rectificatory	  commitment.	  	  	  	   Indeed,	  Tadros’s	  decision	  to	  frame	  his	  theory	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  “next	  best”	  conformity	  to	  duties	  is	  also	  unsettling	  for	  another	  reason.	  Is	  protecting	  victims	  of	  wrongful	  harm	   from	   future	   harm	   really	   the	   next	   best	   thing	   that	   those	  who	   have	   harmed	   them	   in	  breach	  of	  their	  duty	  not	  to	  do	  so	  can	  offer?	  For	  one	  thing,	  if,	  as	  Raz	  suggests,	  doing	  the	  next	  best	  thing	  requires	  the	  duty	  violator	  to	  provide	  the	  victim	  with	  an	  equivalence	  (or	  as	  close	  an	  equivalence	  as	  can	  be)	  to	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  his	  primary	  duty—so	  that	  his	  breach	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  “made-­‐up”—then	  it	  is	  at	  least	  plausible	  that	  certain	  harms	  have	  no	  equivalence	  (or	  even	  near	  equivalence).	  Raz	  speaks	  of	  such	  harms	  as	  non-­‐compensable	  harms.	  He	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  hurt	  feelings	  arising	  from	  having	  been	  unable	  to	  attend	  one’s	  mother’s	  wedding	  overseas,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  friend’s	  breached	  promise	  to	  facilitate	  it.39	  We	  may	  also	  think	  in	  such	   terms	  of	  various	  harmful	  criminal	  wrongs.	  Consider	  rapes	  and	  the	  damage	   they	  can	  occasion	   to	  people’s	   sense	  of	   sexual	   integrity	  and	  dignity	  as	  autonomous	  agents,	  assaults	  resulting	  in	  the	  permanent	  loss	  of	  a	  limb	  or,	  say,	  murders	  and	  the	  irreversible	  consequent	  loss	  of	  life	  for	  both	  the	  person	  killed	  and	  those	  who	  cared	  about	  her.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  at	  least	   plausible	   that	   some	   harms	   are	   incommensurable	   with	   anything	   else,	   and	   that	   any	  claims	  or	  attempts	  to	  rectify	  them	  with	  something	  as	  good,	  or	  nearly	  as	  good,	  ex	  post	  facto	  can	  only	  add	  insult	  to	  injury.40	  	  	  	   At	   first	   sight,	  Tadros	  seems	  sensitive	   to	   this	  possibility.	  After	  all,	  his	  argument	   for	  the	  justification	  of	  punishment	  overtly	  rests	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  some	  wrongfully-­‐imposed	  harms	  are	  unlikely	   to	  be	  compensated	  adequately.	  The	  problem	   is	   that,	   in	   this	  context	  at	  least,	  Tadros	  seems	  to	  understand	  compensation	  in	  a	  much	  narrower	  sense	  than	  the	  one	  in	  which	   I	   am	   using	   the	   term.	   While	   I	   have	   been	   using	   it,	   and	   will	   continue	   to	   use	   it,	  generically	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  an	  equivalence,	  or	  near	  equivalence,	  for	  a	  breach	  of	  duty,	  Tadros	  mostly	  uses	  compensation	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  specific	  currency	  of	  compensation—namely,	  monetary	   compensation.	   As	   I	   hinted	   above,	   he	   generally	   resorts	   to	   other	   terms	  such	   as	   rectification	   and	   remediation	   to	   capture	   the	   broader	   idea.41	   The	   distinction	   is	  
                                                	  39	  Raz,	  “Personal	  Practical	  Conflicts”,	  supra	  note	  27,	  at	  p.	  192.	  	  40	   Raz	   himself	   presents	   a	   strong	   argument	   for	   such	   incommensurability	   in:	   Joseph	   Raz,	   The	   Morality	   of	  
Freedom	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1986),	  at	  ch.	  13.	  	  41	  See	  e.g.,	  Tadros,	  The	  Ends	  of	  Harm,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  pp.	  277,	  283,	  322.	  To	  be	  fair,	  Tadros	  sometimes	  also	  uses	  compensation	  in	  its	  broader	  sense,	  but	  he	  does	  so	  rarely	  and	  inconsistently	  (see	  e.g.	  pp.	  286,	  288,	  291).	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NO.07] important	   because	   Tadros	   seems	   to	   think	   that,	   in	   principle,	   all	   wrongful	   harms	   can	   be	  broadly	  compensated	  (rectified,	  remedied)	  at	  least	  in	  part.	  No	  doubt,	  his	  argument	  for	  this	  claim	   is	   clever	   and	  nicely	   illustrated	  by	   the	   case	  of	  Anna,	  Blake,	   and	  Claire.	  According	   to	  Tadros,	   it	   is	   almost	   always	   possible	   to	   compensate	   (in	   the	   broad	   sense)	   a	   victim	   of	  wrongful	  harm	  by	  preventing	  her	  from	  incurring	  again	  the	  very	  same	  wrongful	  harm.42	  Can	  it	  really	  be	  denied	  that	  something	  can	  be	  compared	  with,	  and	  judged	  equivalent	  to,	  itself?	  Thus,	   Tadros	   argues	   that	  Anna	   compensates	  Blake	   for	   her	   hit	  man	   shooting	   off	   his	   right	  arm	  and	   leg—or,	   to	  use	  his	   terminology,	  rectifies	   this	  wrongful	  harm—by	  protecting	  him	  from	  having	  his	  other	  arm	  and	  leg	  shot	  off	  by	  Claire.	  	  	   A	  key	  difficulty	  with	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  is	  that	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  that	  would	  have	  been	   imposed	  by	  Claire	   is	   not	   the	   same	  as	   the	  one	   imposed	  by	  Anna.	   It	   is	   not	   the	   same,	  except	  perhaps	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  abstract	  categorization	  as	  a	  harm	  of	  comparable	  magnitude	  caused	  by	  an	  assault.	  Here	  are	  some	  possible	  differences.	  Claire	  would	  have	  shot	  off	  Blake’s	  left	   arm	   and	   leg,	   and	   not,	   like	   Anna,	   his	   right	   arm	   and	   leg.	   Thus,	   unless	   Blake	   is	  ambidextrous,	   the	   harm	   Claire	   would	   have	   inflicted	   upon	   him	   would	   likely	   have	   been	  markedly	   different	   in	   degree.	   Anna	   also	   stands	   in	   a	   different	   position	   to	   the	   harm	   she	  imposed—namely,	   she	   was	   an	   accomplice,	   while	   Claire	   would	   have	   inflicted	   her	   harm	  directly.	  Anna’s	  harm	  would	  also	  have	  been	  imposed	  at	  an	  earlier	  point	  in	  time	  than	  Claire’s	  harm.	  More	  fundamentally,	  though,	  the	  harm	  that	  Anna	  wrongfully	  imposes	  on	  Blake	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  Claire’s	  since,	  quite	  simply,	  it	  is	  the	  harm	  that	  Anna,	  and	  not	  Claire,	  wrongfully	  imposes.	   Thus,	   Anna	  preventing	   Claire	   from	   inflicting	   similar	  wrongful	   harm	  on	  Blake	   is	  not	  necessarily	  equivalent,	  or	  nearly	  equivalent,	  to	  her	  having	  fulfilled	  her	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  him	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  If,	  let	  us	  suppose,	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  Anna	  inflicts	  on	  Blake	  is	  of	  the	  non-­‐compensable	   kind,	   then	   protecting	   him	   from	   similar	   harm	   will	   do	   nothing	   to	  compensate	  him.	  	  	  Tadros’s	   insistence	  that	  the	  primary	  justification	  of	  state	  punishment	  is	   its	  general	  deterrence	   effect	   only	   compounds	   the	   problem.	   Why?	   Because	   the	   general	   deterrence	  effect	   of	   punishment	   is	   likely	  best	   conceived	   as	   a	  diffuse	  phenomenon	  which,	   in	   general,	  does	  not	  precisely	  track	  the	  types	  of	  wrongful	  harms	  that	  are	  deterred.	  At	  least,	  this	  is	  the	  way	   in	   which	   Tadros	   himself	   seems	   to	   understand	   the	   phenomenon.	   Punishment,	   he	  writes,	  may	  help	  people	  see	  that	  wrongdoing	  is	  not	  an	  option	  and,	  thus,	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  reducing	  people’s	  inclinations	  to	  perpetrate	  wrongful	  harm.43	  Yet,	  nowhere	  does	  he	  suggest	  that	  the	  general	  deterrence	  effect	  of	  state	  punishment	  can	  be	  specifically	  tailored—
                                                42	  I	  say	  “almost,”	  because	  it	  is	  much	  harder	  to	  argue	  that	  a	  victim	  who	  dies	  as	  a	  result	  of	  wrongdoing	  can	  still	  be	   compensated.	   Tadros	   attempts	   to	   get	   around	   this	   problem	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   next-­‐best	   thing	   for	   the	  wrongdoer	  to	  do	  is	  then	  to	  compensate	  the	  victim’s	  family	  and	  those	  whom	  the	  victim	  cared	  about.	  However,	  he	  acknowledges	  the	  trickiness	  of	  such	  cases,	  especially	  if	  the	  victim	  did	  not	  care	  about	  anyone	  else.	  See	  ibid.,	  at	  p.	  281.	  	  43	  Ibid.,	  at	  pp.	  281-­‐282.	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  at	  least	  always	  be	  so	  tailored—to	  deter	  wrongful	  inflictions	  of	  harm	  that	  match	  those	  for	  which	  wrongdoers	   are	   punished.	   In	   fact,	   it	   would	   seem	   farfetched	   to	   hold	   that	   criminal	  punishment	  of	  a	  wrongdoer	  can	  only	  be	  justified	  if	  it	  deters	  at	  least	  one	  instance	  of	  the	  very	  same	  kind	  of	  wrongful	  harm.	  Insofar	  as	  I	  know,	  Tadros	  does	  not	  hold	  this	  view,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  of	  his	  hypothetical	  examples	  tend	  to	  emulate	  my	  comparison	  between	  Anna	  and	  Claire,	  and	   involve	   fairly	  symmetrical	  harmful	  wrongdoing.	  This	   interpretation	  of	  his	  position	  is	  reinforced	  by	  his	  assertion,	  explored	  earlier,	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  next-­‐best	  duties	  of	   protection	   is	   set	   not	   so	   much	   by	   the	   kind	   and	   magnitude	   of	   wrongful	   harm	   that	   a	  wrongdoer	  actually	  imposed,	  but	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  harm	  that	  could	  permissibly	  have	  been	  inflicted	  on	  him	  to	  avert	  his	  original	   threat.	   	  Thus,	  even	   if	  Tadros	   is	   right	   that	  protection	  against	   future	  wrongful	  harm	  can	  compensate	  prior	  wrongful	  harm	  of	   the	  same	  kind	  and	  magnitude,	  issues	  of	  compensability	  still	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  his	  broader	  general	  deterrence	  justification	  of	  state	  punishment.	  	  	  One	   reason	  why	  he	  may	  not	   see,	  or	  acknowledge,	   the	  compensability	  problems	   to	  which	  I	  am	  referring	  may	  have	  to	  do	  with	  his	  understanding	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  others.	   Indeed,	   it	  seems	  commonsensical	   that	  we	  first	  need	  to	  know	  why	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  if	  we	  are	  to	  be	  able	  to	  work	  out	  what	  counts	  as	  its	  next-­‐best	  satisfaction.44	  If,	  as	  Tadros	  seems	  to	  believe,	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  others	  is	  best	  understood	  at	  a	  high	  level	  of	  abstraction,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  inherent	  badness	  of	  reducing	  people’s	  well-­‐being	  through	  unjust	  means,	  then	  there	  may	  exist	  many	  ways	  to	  compensate	  such	  reductions.	  In	  other	  words,	  well-­‐being	  may	  be	   such	   a	   generic	   concept	   that	   an	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   it	   can	  generate	   a	   false	   impression	   that	   equivalences,	   or	   near	   equivalences,	   can	  be	   found	   for	   all	  kinds	  of	  harms.	  Recall,	   in	   this	   light,	  Tadros’s	   remarks	   that	   if	  a	   system	  of	  compensation—presumably,	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  his	  narrow	  sense	  of	  the	  term—could	  make	  people	  better	  off	   than	  a	   criminal	   justice	   system,	  while	  using	   the	   same	   resources,	   then	   the	   latter	  would	  likely	  be	  impermissible.	  	  	  Here,	   we	  meet	   again	   Tadros-­‐the-­‐grand-­‐unifier	   who	   seems	   to	   believe	   in	   deep	   and	  widespread	  commensurability	  of	  values.	  If	  he	  is	  right	  and,	  in	  principle,	  all	  harms	  have	  their	  price	  and	  can	  be	  compensated,	   then	  one	  cannot	  help	  but	  wonder:	  why	  not	  bite	  the	  bullet	  and	   simply	   become	   the	   advocate	   of	   a	   unified	   system	   of	   compensation	   using	   the	   most	  generic	  currency	  of	  all—namely,	  money?	  Such	  a	  system	  could	  have	  numerous	  advantages,	  including	   the	  maximization	   of	   victims’	   choices	   about	   how	   best	   to	  make	   use	   of	   adequate	  compensation,	   thus	   bolstering	   a	   value	   otherwise	   central	   to	   Tadros’s	   account.	   Indeed,	  assuming	  that	  Anna	  owes	  something	  to	  Blake	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  wrongful	  harm	  she	  caused	  him,	   it	   is	   not	   obvious	   that	   this	   ‘something’	   must	   be	   the	   direct	   protection	   or	   general	  deterrence	   that	  would	   result	   from	  her	  being	  harmed	   in	  punishment.	  After	   all,	   this	   is	   not	  how	  we	   interpret	   the	  duty	   she	  has	   in	   a	   typical	   tort	   case.	   Imagine	   that	  Blake’s	  well-­‐being	  could	  be	   sufficiently	   ‘made	  up’	  were	  Anna	   to	  give	  him	  enough	  money	   to	  acquire	   cutting-­‐edge	   prosthetic	   limbs,	   a	   round-­‐the-­‐clock	   personal	   helper,	   and	   a	   condominium	   unit	   in	   a	  sunny	  beach	  resort	  where,	  for	  years	  to	  come,	  he	  could	  evade	  the	  stresses	  of	  daily	  life.	  Could	  
                                                44	  For	  an	  elaboration	  of	  this	  idea,	  see	  John	  Gardner,	  “What	  is	  Tort	  Law	  For?”,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  pp.	  33,	  40.	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NO.07] this	   not	   discharge	   her	   duty	   to	   do	   the	   next	   best	   thing?	   As	   the	   remarks	   recalled	   above	  suggest,	  Tadros	  comes	  very	  close	  to	  endorsing	  this	  position.	  	  	  Three	  factors	  seem	  to	  stop	  him.	  First,	  he	  emphasizes	  the	  very	  high	  sums	  of	  money	  that	  may	  be	  required	  to	  compensate	  some	  wrongful	  harms,	  and	  the	   likelihood	  that	  many	  wrongdoers	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  pay.	  This	  argument	  strikes	  me	  as	  weak.	  The	  extraordinary	  sums	  it	  might	  take	  to	  compensate	  someone	  who	  has	  suffered	  a	  violent	  crime	  can	  hardly	  be	  considered	   a	   reason	   not	   to	   rely	   on	   a	   monetary	   compensation	   scheme	   when	   people	   are	  actually	  able	  to	  pay	  those	  sums.	  After	  all,	  in	  many	  jurisdictions,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  sue	  people	  for	  intentional	  civil	  wrongs,	  such	  as	  the	  tort	  of	  battery.	  Moreover,	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  people	  might	  be	  unable	  to	  pay	  the	  required	  sums	  only	  shows	  that	  other	  responses	  to	  crime—like	  incarceration—may	   be	   needed	   as	   a	   backstop.	   It	   does	   not	   demonstrate	   that	   such	   other	  responses	  should	  be	  the	  default	  ones.	  	  	  Second,	  Tadros	  sometimes	  seems	  to	  think	  that,	  without	  a	  minimum	  level	  of	  societal	  security	   from	  wrongful	   harm	  provided	  by	   the	   general	   deterrence	   effect	   of	   institutions	  of	  state	  punishment,	  no	  worthwhile	  monetary	  options	  such	  as	  those	  suggested	  above	  would	  be	  available	  to	  someone	   like	  Blake.	  A	  blunt	  way	  to	  put	  this	  point	  may	  be	  that	  no	  one	  can	  individually	   buy	   his	   way	   out	   of	   the	   state	   of	   nature.	   Again,	   I	   find	   this	   argument	  unsatisfactory.	   For	   one	   thing,	   it	   assumes	   that	  Blake	   could	   not	   use	   the	  money	   to	   relocate	  somewhere	  else—perhaps	  another	  country	  or	  a	  desert	  island—where	  this	  minimum	  level	  of	   security	   is	   available.	   It	   also	   seems	   to	   assume,	   without	   argument,	   that	   punishing	   an	  assaulter	   by,	   say,	   sending	  her	   to	  prison	   is	   necessarily	   the	  best	  way	  of	   advancing	   general	  deterrence.	  What	   if	  Anna	  were	   to	  pay	   the	   salary	  of	   five	   full-­‐time	  police	   officers,	   and	   this	  were	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  vastly	  greater	  general	  deterrence	  effect	  than,	  say,	  sending	  her	  to	  prison?	  Could	  that	  not	  discharge	  her	  wrongdoing-­‐derived	  duty	  to	  Blake?	  Tadros	  might	  try	  to	   argue	   that,	   unlike	   institutionalized	   general	   deterrence,	   such	   individualized	   protective	  remediation	  would	  not	  ensure	  the	  kind	  of	  stable	  social	  peace	  required	  for	  lasting	  individual	  flourishing.	  However,	   such	  an	   institutional,	   not	   to	   say	   statist,	   response	  would	  be	   in	   clear	  tension	  with	  the	  more	  bottom-­‐up	  moral	  justification	  of	  punishment	  that	  he	  otherwise	  seeks	  to	  defend	   in	  TEH,	   and	  which	  assumes	   that	  punishment	  may	  sometimes	  be	  permissible	   in	  isolated	  cases	  like	  on	  desert	  islands	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Anna	  and	  Blake.	  	  	  Thirdly,	  Tadros	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  various	  non-­‐compensatory	  aspects	  of	  state	   punishment:	   leading	   wrongdoers	   to	   recognize	   that	   what	   they	   did	   was	   wrong;	  educating	   people	   not	   to	   do	   wrong	   and,	   thus,	   preventing	   them	   from	   being	   saddled	   with	  onerous	  duties	   to	   compensate	   in	   the	   first	   place;	   enhancing	  people’s	   overall	   security,	   and	  sense	   of	   security;	   facilitating	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   people’s	   duties	   to	   rescue	   others;	   etc.	   This	  point	  is	  the	  most	  promising,	  although	  it	  reflects	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  deeper	  problem	  with	  Tadros’s	   theory.	   No	   doubt,	   insofar	   as	   the	   practice	   of	   state	   punishment	   serves	   such	  secondary	  functions,	   it	   is	  all	   the	  better	   for	   it.	  However,	  characterizing,	  as	  Tadros	  does,	  all	  such	   functions	   as	   secondary	   and	   framing	   the	   justificatory	   core	   of	   the	   practice	   as	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   risks	   concealing	  different,	   and	  perhaps	  more	  particular,	   rationales	   for	   the	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  others	  that	  may	  ascribe	  a	  much	  more	  primary	  role	  to	  some	  of	  them.	  	  	  As	   I	   suggested,	  one	  plausible	   such	   rationale	   is	   that	  one	   should	  not	  do	  detrimental	  things	  to	  others	  which,	  in	  salient	  ways,	  cannot	  be	  made	  up.	  Thus,	  one	  should	  not	  lastingly	  deprive	  others	  of	  the	  usage	  of	  their	  limbs	  or	  other	  crucial	  organs.	  One	  should	  not	  kill	  them	  or	  kill	   their	  nearest	  and	  dearest.	  One	   should	  also	  not	   cause	   them	  enduring	  psychological	  trauma	   by	   violating	   their	   bodily	   integrity	   or	   sense	   of	   security	   in	   their	   homes	   and	   other	  surroundings.	  Tadros’s	  spirited	  attempt	  to	  portray	  punishment	  as	  one	  practical	  segment	  of	  a	  unified	  and	  seamless	  morality	  of	  harm	  allocation,	  which,	   at	   a	  bottom,	   is	  no	  different	   in	  kind	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  compensation,	  obscures	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  central	  function	  of	  the	  practice	  consists	   in	   responding	   to	  such	  non-­‐compensable	  wrongfully-­‐imposed	  harms.	  Of	   course,	   this	   does	   not	   entail	   that	   punishment	   cannot	   operate	   alongside	   a	   practice	   of	  compensation.	  It	  simply	  means	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  equated	  with	  it.	  This	  argument	  should	  be	  added	  to	  the	  long	  list	  of	  other	  reasons	  for	  disaggregating	  punishment	  from	  compensatory	  practices,	   including	   the	   greater	   importance	   of	   culpability	   for	   the	   former,	   the	   many	  victimless	   crimes	   that	   are	   commonly	   thought	   to	   be	   punishable,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   general	  deterrence	  version	  of	  the	  PCBG	  objection.	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	   as	   importantly,	   the	   plausibly	   close	   relationship	   between	  punishment	   and	  non-­‐compensable	  harms	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  justice	  has	  no	  role	  to	  play	  in	  the	  justification	  of	   the	  practice.	   It	   simply	  means	   that	   corrective	   justice	  may	  not	   play	   the	  pivotal	   role	   that	  Tadros	   thinks	   it	   does.	   As	   I	   suggested,	   distributive	   justice,	   and	   its	   concern	   for	   the	  appropriate	  overall	  division	  of	  goods	  and	  ills	  in	  society	  might	  have	  something	  important	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  discussion.	  Furthermore,	  although	  Tadros	  rejects	  retributive	  conceptions	  of	   justice	   as	   vague	   and,	   often,	   barbaric,	   they	   can	   at	   least	   avoid	   my	   commensurability	  objection.	   They	   can	   avoid	   it,	   insofar	   as	   their	   focus	   is	   on	   giving	   wrongdoers	   what	   they	  deserve.	  That	   is,	   retributive	   justice	  need	  not	   require	   that	   anything	  be	  given	   to	  victims	  of	  wrongful	  harm,	  let	  alone	  anything	  nearly	  as	  good	  as	  them	  not	  having	  incurred	  this	  harm	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Despite	  what	  may	  transpire	  from	  overly	  strict	  interpretations	  of	  retributive	  justice—e.g.,	   ‘an	   eye	   for	   an	   eye’—the	   concept	   of	   desert	   also	   need	   not	   entail	   any	   kind	   of	  commensurability	  between	  the	  wrongful	  ills	  incurred	  by	  victims,	  and	  those	  to	  be	  imposed	  retributively	  on	  wrongdoers.	   Insofar	  as	   I	  am	  right	  here,	  retributive	   justice,	   too,	  may	  have	  important	  insights	  to	  contribute	  to	  punishment	  theory.	  In	  other	  words,	  justice	  may	  not	  be	  as	   unified	   a	   value	   as	   Tadros	   sometimes	   seems	   to	   think	   it	   is,45	   let	   alone,	   as	   I	   argued	   in	  section	  II,	  the	  one	  seamlessly	  unifying	  master	  moral	  value.	  Thus,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  the	  most	  promising	   roads	   ahead	   in	   Tadros’s	   valorous	   quest	   for	   the	   justification	   of	   criminal	  punishment	   lie	   away	   from	  Victor’s	   justice,	  understood	  as	  an	  undifferentiated	  and	  master	  metric.	  They	  also,	  most	  certainly,	  lie	  away	  from	  Victor’s	  corrective	  justice.	  	  	  
                                                45	  Rawls	  himself	  insists	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  distributive	  and	  retributive	  justice	  in	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  
supra	   note	   18,	   at	   pp.	   276-­‐277,	   while	   many	   since	   Aristotle	   (EN	   1130b30ff)	   also	   insist	   on	   the	   distinction	  between	  distributive	  and	  corrective	  justice.	  	  	  
